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This paper considers the role of social model features in the economic performance of Italy and Spain during 
the run-up to the Eurozone crisis, as well as the consequences of that crisis, in turn, for the two countries social 
models.  It takes issue with the prevailing view - what I refer to as the “competitiveness thesis” - which attri-
butes the debtor status of the two countries to a lack of competitive capacity rooted in social model features. 
This competitiveness thesis has been key in justifying the “liberalization plus austerity” measures that European 
institutions have demanded in return for financial support for Italy and Spain at critical points during the crisis. 
The paper challenges this prevailing wisdom.  First, it reviews the characteristics of the Italian and Spanish 
social models and their evolution in the period prior to the crisis, revealing a far more complex, dynamic and 
differentiated picture than is given in the political economy literature. Second, the paper considers various ways 
in which social model characteristics are said to have contributed to the Eurozone crisis, finding such explana-
tions wanting. Italy and Spain´s debtor status was primarily the result of much broader dynamics in the Euro-
zone, including capital flows from richer to poorer countries that affected economic demand, with social model 
features playing, at most, an ancillary role.  More aggressive reforms responding to EU demands in Spain may 
have increased the long term social and economic costs of the crisis, whereas the political stalemate that slowed 
such reforms in Italy may have paradoxically mitigated these costs.  The comparison of the two countries thus 
suggests that, in the absence of broader macro-institutional reform of the Eurozone, compliance with EU dic-
tates may have had perverse effects.     
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Eurozone crisis and social 
models: what we can 
learnfrom italy and spaini-
taly and 
 
Explanations of the ongoing crisis of the Eurozone 
tend to fall into two –not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive – categories: 1) those that emphasize the 
shortfalls of the currency union’s macro-institutional 
architecture (monetary union without fiscal or bank-
ing union), and 2) those that emphasize structural 
characteristics of the Eurozone’s debtor countries 
as the source of the intra-Eurozone financial imbal-
ances that became the focus of bond markets during 
the sovereign debt crisis.  It is the latter view – what 
Fitoussi and Saraceno (2013) have referred to as the 
“Berlin -Washington consensus” and has later come 
to be known as the “Brussels-Frankfurt” consensus - 
that carried the day in the Eurozone and lies behind 
the “pro-cyclical austerity cum structural reforms” 
formula that has been imposed on debtor countries by 
their European institutions (the Commission and, for 
a time, the ECB) and other Eurozone governments 
(the Eurogroup).  Chief among the demands of the 
EU - carried out by way of both formal and informal 
modalities of conditionality attached to critical fi-
nancial support during the debt crisis - were budget-
ary cuts that have fallen heavily on social protection 
programs along with changes in labor market regu-
lation intended to facilitate internal devaluation via 
downward adjustments in labor costs.  Even when 
the perverse effects for growth of this approach of 
labor market liberalization coupled with pro-cyclical 
fiscal measures have been recognized by important 
actors (the IMF and, less openly, the Commission,
[see Bontout and Lokajickova 2013; European 
Comission 2012b]) warnings against any slow down 
in fiscal consolidation and calls for further structural 
reforms in debtor countries have remained the order 
of the day in intergovernmental negotiations within 
the Eurogroup. Meanwhile, changes to the macro-
institutional architecture of the Eurozone that could 
limit the damage inflicted on debtor states (such as, 
for instance, the issuance of mutualized debt instru-
ments to end the risk of sovereign defaults and re-
denomination) have remained blocked by intergov-
ernmental impasse or put on timelines that preclude 
real relief in the foreseeable future (as is the case 
with key elements of banking union). All this re-
flects the conviction (central to the Brussels-Frank-
furt consensus) that the situation in which the debtor 
countries find themselves is in some way or other to 
blame on excesses in their “social models” (Dølvik 
and Martin, forthcoming), that is to say their systems 
of labor market regulation and social protection. 
 The experiences of Italy and Spain are of 
particular relevance to this debate surrounding the 
sources of the Eurozone crisis and the repercussions 
of the austerity centered approach adopted by the 
EU.  With the third and fourth largest economies 
in the currency area, the two countries are widely 
seen as determinant for the future of the Eurozone 
at large.  At the same time, Italy and Spain have 
traditionally been identified in the welfare state and 
Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) literatures as repre-
senting a “Southern European” model of capital-
ism characterized by social policy and labor market 
features that have pernicious effects:  low levels of 
labor market participation (in particular by women), 
dualism between long time labor market insiders 
and outsiders and collective bargaining institutions 
that undermine competitiveness.  From this charac-
terization it is an easy step to the conclusion that 
social model characteristics must have been behind 
the situation the two countries found themselves in 
from 2010 onwards when the Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis spread beyond the smaller peripheral 
states in the currency area.  Indeed, the character-
ization of these countries in much of the VOC lit-
erature appears to vindicate the Brussels-Frankfurt 
consensus on the roots of the Eurozone crisis. 
 A closer look at the evolution of welfare 
state and labor market institutions in the two coun-
tries both prior to and following the sovereign debt 
crisis, however, sheds a far more complex picture: 
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one that reveals important differences in their socio-
economic and political dynamics as well as the ex-
tent to which social model change and its econom-
ic effects in each country have depended on wider 
macro-economic developments in the Eurozone. 
 This paper takes up the question of whether 
Italy and Spain’s fate in the Eurozone crisis can be 
attributed to the social model features that have been 
the focus of current reforms. It argues that there are 
multiple ways in which the two countries’ experi-
ences challenge the underlying assumptions and ad-
equacy of the course that they have been encouraged, 
when not forced, to follow by their Euro partners via 
both formal and informal conditionality.   In the sec-
tions that follow, I first describe the evolution of the 
Italian and Spanish social models in the period prior 
to the crisis, pointing to different reform patterns that 
were strongly affected by the different political and 
macro-economic constraints that governments faced 
at various points. Prior to the crisis, the domestic pol-
itics of institutional reform had moved the Spanish 
social model considerably closer to that of its North-
ern EU neighbors than was the case for Italy. This, 
however, did little to prevent the economic boom 
and bust that Spain experienced following monetary 
union.  While Italy experienced less social model 
change and made less headway on such critical mea-
sures as labor force activation in the pre-crisis pe-
riod, this can be attributed, to a significant extent, 
to the radically different macro-economic conditions 
with which it joined the Eurozone. Governments of 
the Left in Italy failed repeatedly in their attempts to 
shift the balance of social spending in a more activa-
tion friendly direction largely because of these mac-
ro-economic conditions. The lack of attention paid to 
the relationship between macro-economic constraint 
and the politics of social model reform is one of the 
striking short-comings of the analysis that lies behind 
the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus, which has served 
to justify the de facto imposition of reforms in areas 
well beyond the remit of EU institutions, contributing 
to economic hardship and raising fundamental ques-
tions of democratic accountability in both countries. 
 
 The second section of the paper focuses on 
the contrasting economic performances of Italy and 
Spain in the run-up to the Eurozone crisis. It con-
siders various arguments that have been offered for 
how social model features may have contributed to 
the two countries’ situation at the time of the cri-
sis.  While social model features and developments 
can explain some of the contrast in the labor mar-
ket performance of the two countries during this 
period, there is little to suggest that they played a 
determinant role in producing the much touted loss 
of competitiveness the two countries suffered during 
the first eight years of monetary union or their vul-
nerability to contagion as the sovereign debt crisis 
developed.  Developments within the Eurozone at 
large involving a rise in household savings in some 
of the richer countries (Germany in particular) and 
the intensification of financial flows within the cur-
rency zone from from richer to poorer countries 
over the pre-crisis period (Lane and Pels 2012; Pet-
tis 2012) appear to have played a more fundamental 
role, along with other country characteristics that do 
not form part of what we can call their social models.
 
 The third and last section of the paper reviews 
the responses of the Italian and Spanish governments 
to the Eurozone crisis and the impact this has had on 
the two countries’ social models. While only Spain 
was forced to sign a memorandum of understanding 
with the troika in order to obtain a credit line for the 
rescue of its banking sector in 2011, reforms in both 
countries were heavily determined by what Sacchi 
et al. (2010) have referred to as “informal but strong 
conditionality” imposed by the Eurogroup in coor-
dination with the ECB starting in 2010.  With an al-
ready more market-oriented social protection system 
and the advent of a center-right government with an 
absolute majority in 2011, Spain moved considerably 
faster and further in the direction of labor market de-
regulation advanced by the troika than Italy, where 
electoral results forced a slower pace of reform and a 
different trade-off between productivity growth and 
employment. Indeed, Italian governments and social 
ces papers - open forum # 4
actors up to 2012 were able to limit the degree of 
job destruction  by building on existing non-market 
mechanisms of employment-sharing without incur-
ring any substantially higher bond market penalty 
than Spain, even though Spain’s internal devaluation 
and competitiveness measures improved consider-
ably and Italy’s continued to deteriorate.    These 
facts - due largely to the negative feedback effect of 
employment and household income insecurity on do-
mestic demand and lending in Spain – present a real 
challenge for the assumptions underpinning the Brus-
sels-Frankfurt consensus.  They raise the possibility 
that Spain’s faster and more decisive embrace of the 
troika’s prescriptions in the midst of an economic 
downturn and in the absence of substantial macro-
institutional reform of the Eurozone may in the end 
bear little advantage. Indeed, they illustrate the dan-
ger that liberalizing labor market reform imposed in 
the context of pro-cyclical spending cuts and without 
decisive change in the Eurozone’s institutions may 
only lead countries to fall into a “bad” economic 
equilibrium (de Grauwe 2012; Grauwe and Ji 2012; 
Wyplosz  2012; 2013) and impair growth in the long 
term by disregarding the relationship between pres-
ent and future output (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2013). 
I.The Spanish and Italian Social Models: evolu-
tion in the pre-crisis period 
 
 The social models of the countries of South-
ern Europe have often defied easy categorization. 
Nonetheless, following the work of Leibfried (1992) 
and Ferrera (1996), who emphasized the limited de-
velopment of social policy, the male breadwinner 
bias in social spending and labor market regulation 
and the central role of the family as a safety net, Italy 
and Spain have commonly been described in the Va-
rieties of Capitalism (VOC) literature as sharing  a 
distinct “South –European,”  or “familial” model of 
welfare capitalism (see Rhodes 1996; Bonoli 1997: 
Trifiletti 1999; Crouch 1999; Naldini 2003;  Amable 
2004).  This view of the two countries, however, was 
based fundamentally on snap-shots taken in the late 
1980s and early 1990s when their welfare state and 
centrated in old age pensions and little if any income 
support going to people who did not have extensive 
contribution records (younger population cohorts, 
working age families, and women in general). Nei-
ther country had an adequate system of minimum 
income support for those of working age and this 
was reflected in high levels of dependence upon the 
family as a safety net, low female labor force par-
ticipation rates and fertility, and higher than average 
rates of poverty risk. Most importantly, the logic of 
this familial model of welfare provision was seen 
to be self-reinforcing as high levels of employment 
protection and old age pensions served to compen-
sate the mostly male breadwinners of earlier de-
cades – ensconced as union insiders – for the lack 
of other forms of income support and security for 
themselves and their families. According to some 
authors, this combination of welfare state features 
was also believed to undergird a tendency toward 
low-wage production strategies and/or regional di-
visions and a firm structure skewed towards overly 
small firms, thereby locking these countries into a 
self-perpetuating “Southern syndrome” of low em-
ployment rates and productivity growth (Amable 
2005; Rhodes 1996; Hancke and Herrmann 2007).
 The perception that the two countries rep-
resented a distinct variety of capitalism with its 
particular logic and set of deleterious consequences 
was also reinforced by work on their industrial re-
lations systems, characterized by the coexistence 
of competing labor confederations, a complicated 
combination of sometimes overlapping levels of 
wage bargaining (in particular in Italy) (Regini 
1979, 1997) or a national employer confederations 
that, although  highly encompassing, did not have 
adequate leadership capacity vis à  vis its affiliates 
(the case of Spain) (Perez 2000; Regini 1979; 1997; 
Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). An intermediately 
centralized bargaining structure combined with high 
levels of employment protection and divided labor 
organizations were believed to undermine efforts to 
deliver coordinated wage moderation (Regini 1984; 
Crouch 1985).  And although both countries shared 
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a substantial history of nationally negotiated incomes 
policy - or “concertation” – pacts designed to deliver 
wage restraint, by the late 1980s these efforts appeared 
to have broken down indefinitely in Italy and be on 
the verge of collapse in Spain (Negrelli ; Perez 2000). 
 This in a nutshell, was the scenario at the 
start of the 1990s when efforts to characterize the 
two economies in relation to the VOC literature’s 
juxtaposition of liberal and coordinated market 
economies took place.  The subsequent two de-
cades saw significant changes in the two countries. 
Nonetheless, the view that the Southern econo-
mies were subject to a distinct historical logic so-
cially rooted in their welfare and labor market in-
stitutions has proven influential.    And even after 
pointing out a much wider set of institutional fac-
tors on which the two countries often differ, Am-
able (2005, p. 242) would go as far as to write that 
the high-skill-level job-security route seems mostly 
out of reach for Mediterranean capitalism,102 and 
a competitive model based on flexibility is much 
more in order. Implementing this model potentially 
means meeting some considerable opposition from 
insiders.  Leaders of these countries would there-
fore welcome any political support at the supra-
national level. It would be easier to overcome do-
mestic opposition if the labour flexibility measures 
appeared to come from a European initiative… 
  As is evident, such VOC interpretations 
of Italy and Spain’s social models encourage pre-
cisely the type of interventions and prescriptions 
that lie at the heart of the Berlin-Washington con-
sensus and have guided the “informal but strong” 
(Sacchi 2013) conditionality that both countries 
have faced in the course of the Eurozone crisis.  A 
review of developments in the two decades prior to 
the crisis, however, suggests that the conclusions 
that might be drawn from these rather static efforts 
at classification fail to take into account the dynam-
ics of social model change in the two countries.
 
 
 By the mid 2000s some of the postulated 
similarities between the two cases had waned  and 
what was once thought to be a common set of self-
perpetuating and path-dependent socio-economic 
dynamics appeared more a matter of temporary co-
incidence.  First, while from the standpoint of the 
early 1990s, the social protection system of the two 
countries might not have appeared different, this 
had changed considerably.  On one hand, between 
1996 and 2007 Italy’s total social expenditures rose 
(from 20 percent to 26.7 percent of GDP) right up 
to the EU15 average, while Spain’s (at only 21 per-
cent of GDP in 2007) continued to place that coun-
try at the very low end of the Eurozone (and closer 
to the highest spenders among the new EU mem-
ber states from the CEE).  But on the other hand, 
the distribution of spending in Italy remained very 
skewed towards old age pensions (see Figure 1 be-
low), consistently around 51-52 per cent of all social 
spending (compared with an EU15 average of 37-39 
per cent), while in Spain the overall weight of old 
age pensions in social spending had dropped from 
41 percent in 1996 to 38 percent in 2007. This was 
the result of a far more successful process of pen-
sion bargains with unions (which had lowered pen-
sion spending to 9% in 2007, well below the EU15 
average) and a fairly consistent effort by Spanish 
governments to shift spending to benefits support-
ing those of working age workers through family, 
labour market, health care and sickness policies. 
Figure 1. Social expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: OECD.StatExtract iLibrary (downloaded May 4, 2012) 
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minimum non-contributory pensions for those with-
out significant work histories, income maintenance 
of last resort for those of working age (above the ex-
tremely rudimentary levels of local social assistance 
that existed at the end of the 1980s),  universal free 
childcare for children from the age of 3 introduced in 
1990 (and a plan to extend this to children from age 
0 introduced in 2007 that later had to be cancelled 
as a result of austerity measures), the extension of 
unemployment insurance to workers on temporary 
contracts (a feature that clearly distinguished Spain 
from  Italy)  and to the self-employed in 2007, the in-
troduction of an “emancipation” subsidy to facilitate 
the ability of young people between 22-30 years of 
age to afford rental housing,  and the  so-called “de-
pendency” law of 2006 that requires regions to allo-
cate part of their social spending budgets to provide 
non-means tested, in-home care for the elderly and 
the disabled. This offers a striking contrast to Italy’s 
repeated failure to establish even the most rudimen-
tary piece of a more developed welfare state - a na-
tional income of last resort scheme - and, until the 
Fornero reform of 2012, to expand the availability 
of unemployment insurance beyond those on indefi-
nite work contracts with long contribution periods. 
In spite of an increasingly apparent public awareness 
of the biases of the Italian welfare state and its con-
sequences, little progress had been made by the end 
of the 2000s in these areas, or in others such as fam-
ily policy and active labor force activation policies. 
 Alongside the Spanish shift in the structure 
of social spending, the other key point of departure 
between the two countries involved the regulation of 
employment.  Spain initiated a far earlier and radical 
liberalization of employment through the legaliza-
tion of fixed-term contracts as early as 1984 . While 
Italy would follow course in stepwise fashion in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s (see below), the Spanish 
dualization of its labor market went well beyond that 
of any other EU15 state, with temporary employment 
contracts accounting for over 30 percent of total from 
the early 1990s on. At the same time, however, Spain 
also gradually expanded its unemployment protection 
Thus, while overall social spending in Spain remained 
particularly low, the structure of that spending had 
moved much closer into line with that of the rest of the 
EU 15 (see also Moreno ; Guillen 2011 for discussion). 
 From 1996 to 2007, Spanish governments 
increased their spending on sickness and healthcare 
from 29 to 31 per cent, social exclusion from 0.8 
to 1.3 per cent (compared to Italy’s minimal move 
from  0.1-0.2 per cent), and benefits for families and 
children from 2.3 per in 1996 (then just a quarter 
of the EU15 average) to 6 per cent in 2007, while 
Italy  increased its spending in this area from just 
3.5 to 4.7 per cent.  Between 2004 and 2008 Spain 
also spent twice as much as Italy on labour market 
policy, increasing that expenditure as a proportion 
of GDP from 2.1 per cent in 2004 to 2.5 percent in 
2008, while Italy’s fell from 1.3 to 1.2 per cent of 
GDP over the same period. By 2007-2008 Spain was 
spending as much of its GDP on labour market poli-
cies as the EU’s leaders in this area (the Netherlands 
and Denmark). Nonetheless, the greater part of that 
spending went to income maintenance benefits rath-
er than active labour market policy. Indeed, most of 
the difference between Italy and Spain’s labor mar-
ket expenditure was due to Spain’s more developed 
non-contributory minimum pension and unemploy-
ment benefit system which protected all categories of 
workers, including workers on fixed-term contracts. 
Although overall coverage in 2008 was still on the 
low side (47 per cent, compared with 80-90 per cent 
in Denmark and Austria), this compared well with 
Italy’s 17 per cent.  Moreover, the gross earnings re-
placement rate during the first year of unemployment 
(though not thereafter) and the overall duration of ben-
efits in Spain were relatively high by EU standards. 
 The difference in the evolution of the Italian 
and Spanish social model was not just one of quanti-
ties. In what has been called the “Northern turn” of the 
Spanish model, social model developments in Spain 
also included qualitative changes introduced by gov-
ernments of both the Left and the Right (Moreno and 
Sarasa 2008;  Guillen 2010; Guillen and Leon 2011): 
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system from the early 1990s, turning it into a univer-
sal system covering all types of workers. By contrast, 
in Italy – where unemployment protection required 
particularly long contribution periods – it remained 
restricted to workers with indefinite contracts and 
extensive work histories, and drops in labor demand 
were also addressed through insurance and work-
time sharing schemes (Jessoula 2011; Sacchi 2013), 
creating a stronger bias in favor of old timers than 
in Spain.  In this regard, the regulation of the Span-
ish labor market moved several degrees closer to that 
of its Northern European neighbors in providing a 
measure of flexicurity that did not emerge in Italy.
 
 The large share of fixed-term employment 
became an enduring and contentious feature of 
Spain’s political economy from the late 1990s on. 
It has been cast as the cause of Spain’s high struc-
tural unemployment and a potential source of poor 
labor productivity growth (Jimeno and Toharia 1993; 
Bentolila and Dolado 1994) and is blamed on a par-
ticularly intense defense by labor market insiders 
(represented by the unions) in the form of high dis-
missal costs for those on indefinite contracts at the 
expense of outsiders (Bentolila, Jimeno and Dolado 
2012). What is less often emphasized is the extent to 
which this liberalization of the Spanish labor mar-
ket at the margins through the liberalization of tem-
porary contracts imbued the Spanish economy with 
a type of hyper-flexibility (albeit a segmented one) 
that has few counterparts in the EU15.  The effects 
of this particular mode of labour market flexibility on 
total employment remain ambiguous. We do know, 
however, that it allowed for intense bouts of rapid 
employment creation and employment shedding in 
response to macro-economic stimuli following mon-
etary union.  Although Italy’s labour market was also 
marked by growing segmentation in employment 
protection combined with an utter absence of any 
universal income of last support mechanisms (what 
Berton et al. (2009) have referred to as a regime of 
flex-insecurity), the existence of non-market mecha-
nisms for employment sharing among labor market 
insiders (at least until the Fornero labor market re-
form of 2012) appear to have helped stave off the de-
gree of employment fluctuation we observe in Spain. 
 
 Lastly, in the area of labour relations, the role 
of collective bargaining was significantly strength-
ened during the run up to EMU both through social 
pacts and unilateral government action. In Italy, the 
abolition of automatic wage indexation (scala mo-
bile) agreed to by the main labor confederations in 
1992 helped the country overcome the economic and 
political debacle of that year, when the existing party 
system collapsed and the lira was force out of the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) (della 
Sala 2004; Culpepper 2008). In Spain, the main cata-
lyst for change was a 1994 government imposed abo-
lition of the system of labor ordinances dating back 
to the Franco era (Perez 2000b).  Though the inten-
tion of that reform had been to liberalize the regula-
tion of work conditions, its effect was that of rais-
ing the profile of collective bargaining as it forced 
unions and employers to bargain on a wider range 
of issues than wage setting. Both countries also saw 
efforts to create a more articulated bargaining struc-
ture in which national sectoral bargains took pre-
cedence in setting wage minima, while productiv-
ity premiums and other matters were left to lower 
bargaining levels (Regini and Regalia 1997; Perez 
2000; 2010).  This effort, turned out to be more de-
cisive in Italy than in Spain where the national em-
ployer confederation could not bring along its lo-
cal affiliates to accept national sectoral bargains in 
many sectors. Coordination in wage bargaining to 
maintain competitiveness, of which there is evidence 
from 1994 on, was thus carried out principally by 
the labor confederations until formal overarching 
wage pacts with employers were renewed in 2001. 
On the other hand, in Italy the concertation process 
re-initiated in 1992 began to collapse in 2001 (just 
as Spain’s was being re-formalized) under pressure 
from the second Berlusconi government (Negrelli 
2011). Indeed, social pact making and concertation 
in Spain lasted much longer (well into the economic 
crisis) than in Italy, leading some observers to speak 
of a virtual institutionalization of the process in that 
country prior to the crisis (Natali and Pochet 2010). 
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 The following section explores the combina-
tion of political, institutional and economic condi-
tions that made for disparate paths of social model 
change in the two countries, before we turn to their 
role in the economic crisis. 
II. The Evolution of the Spanish and Italian So-
cial Models up to the Eurozone crisis
  
 Welfare state and Varieties of Capitalism 
scholars in the past have posited that Italy and Spain 
are subject to self-reinforcing historical dynamics be-
tween welfare state, labor regulation and production 
regime features (Amable 2003 ; Molina and Rhodes 
2007; Hancke and Herrmann 2007). These analy-
ses provide potentially important insights into the 
sources of observed continuities in the two countries. 
Nonetheless, the notion that the social models of Ita-
ly and Spain reflect a similar long-range dynamic ne-
glects crucial differences in the political contexts that 
shaped social and employment policies. These differ-
ences are important in understanding the divergent 
ways in which social protection and labor market reg-
ulation evolved in the period leading up to the crisis. 
 
 The social model that developed in postwar 
Italy was the result of a process of conflict and ac-
commodation between center-right governments 
dominated by the Christian Democratic party, the 
political Left (in particular the Communist Party of 
Italy) and the main labor confederations (the Com-
munist dominated CGIL, the Christian Unionist 
CISL, and the secular but anti-Communist UIL) in 
the course of the Hot Autumn of 1969 and its after-
math. This accommodation included the provision 
of relatively generous old age pension benefits, the 
empowerment of the national confederal unions at 
the firm level, the participation of the confederations 
in the control of contributory pensions, and the es-
tablishment of a mechanism of automatic wage in-
dexation (the scala mobile). By the time of the crisis 
of the so called “First Republic” due to the tangen-
topoli scandals in the period 1991/92, this social 
model had produced very significant wage com-
pression across regions with quite different charac-
teristics (North and South) and a large public debt 
burden derived from the old age pension system. 
 In Spain, by contrast, both the structure of 
wage bargaining and the introduction of a PAYG sys-
tem, as well as some aspects of employment protec-
tion, were all  shaped in the context of the authoritar-
ian right-wing dictatorship of General Franco. The 
transition to a liberal parliamentary regime occurred 
in the context of an acute economic crisis that went 
some way towards containing demands for redistri-
bution by the political Left. The process of building 
a “democratic” social model was thus barely into its 
second decade at the start of the 1990s and this is also 
the way in which it was viewed by domestic actors.  In 
addition, the late transition to democracy also meant 
that Spain enjoyed some of the advantages of a late-
comer to democratic welfare capitalism. When pen-
sion reform, for instance, was undertaken in the mid 
1990s under the leadership of the first post-transition 
conservative government, Spanish unions had fewer 
incentives to block that reform than Italian unions did 
in the 1990s because they were not as heavily domi-
nated by older pensioners as was the case in Italy. 
 
 Constitutional and political developments 
also took the two countries in different directions 
during the 1990s.  In Spain the role of parliament was 
strengthened  (Pérez Díaz 1999) while in Italy the 
collapse of the postwar party system in 1990-1992 
produced a shift from consensus oriented politics to 
a more majoritarian democracy, the emergence of a 
new, bi-polar party-system and a strengthening of the 
executive. Up until its great crisis, the post-war Italian 
Republic had allowed for far greater proportionality 
than Spain’s post-Franco electoral law.  The Span-
ish electoral system, although a party list system, 
involves a strong bias in favor of the two largest par-
ties in any given electoral  circumscription, favoring 
the two major national parties (the Social-democrat-
ic PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español),  and 
Center-right catch-all  PP (Partido Popular)), and the 
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of its internal statutes, the CEOE exercises very 
little authority over its affiliates, making it a par-
ticularly weak organization in comparison to other 
national employer associations with lower member-
ship rates (Costas and Nonell 1996; Nonell et al. 
2006). While Italy’s Confindustria was affected by 
important tensions between its small and large en-
terprise factions, the ultimate dominance of the lat-
ter has generally given it greater capacity of action. 
  
 On the labor side, the Italian confedera-
tions enjoyed a (still relatively high) 34 per cent 
union density rate in 2007 (down from 38 per cent 
in 1990), and this membership was based largely 
in manufacturing industry, providing the national 
confederations a great deal of leverage both at the 
firm and national policy levels. Yet while the Span-
ish labor confederations  had a low membership rate 
(16 percent), they drew their strength far more from 
workplace elections (in which about 80 per cent of 
workers take part) and from the legal framework, 
which  provides that agreements signed above the 
firm level by any union meeting the criteria of “most 
representativeness” (based on work place elections) 
automatically applies to all workers at the sectoral/
territorial level at which it is reached and  that agree-
ments remained in effect until renewed (the principle 
of ultra-activity), at least until the 2012 labor market 
reform. Thus, while unions did not have strong rep-
resentation within firms (with the exception of very 
large firms and the public sector), their representa-
tiveness (as measured by workplace elections) and 
their negotiating capacity far outstripped their for-
mal membership levels. This rendered them capable 
social partners. On the other hand, while Spanish 
unions did not have the role, played by their Italian 
counterparts in co-managing the main public pil-
lar pensions system , as well as the more recently 
created ‘closed’ second-pillar voluntary occupa-
tional pension funds, reforms in the early1990s did 
strengthened their role in managing the public em-
ployment service, the continuing vocational training 
system and health and safety at work (Guillen 2010).
 
mainstream regional nationalist parties where these 
played a central role (Catalonia, the Basque Country, 
Galicia and the Canary Islands).  However, in 1993 
the Italian electoral system was changed to a predom-
inantly SMDP system, producing the coalescence of 
the country’s multiple political parties into left and 
right-wing ‘blocs’. While Spain mostly had minority 
governments by one of the national parties support-
ed by the mainstream regionalist parties (which es-
poused positions ranging from Christian Democratic 
to market-liberalism) in the 1990s and 2000s, Italy 
saw a steady alternation between the Right-wing co-
alition headed by Silvio Berlusconi and the re-com-
bined center-Left. Spain thus arguably had a politi-
cal scenario more propitious to consensus oriented 
social reforms than did Italy in the post 1994 period.
 In addition to these very different political 
contexts, there were also key differences in the social 
model institutions of Italy and Spain that have tended 
to be overlooked by comparative VOC and welfare 
state scholars and that, when taken together, gave 
Spanish social actors and governments a greater ca-
pacity to produce policy coalitions in favor of social 
model reform than their Italian counterparts during 
the 1990s and 2000s.  These differences included  1) 
the cohesiveness of union versus employer organiza-
tions,  2) the administrative role of unions in critical 
areas of the welfare state, 3) the legal framework of 
collective bargaining, which gave unions in Spain 
far more influence than implied by membership 
rates, and 4) the extent to which the wage bargain-
ing system caused cross-regional wage compression. 
 
 The organization of employers, and in par-
ticular the degree of “encompassingness” of em-
ployer associations, has by now been widely rec-
ognized as a fundamental point of difference in the 
political economies of European states (Soskice 
1990; Hall and Soskice 2001; Martin and Swank 
2011).  The Spanish labor confederation (CEOE) 
has a particularly high membership rate at 72 per-
cent, and the Italian employers association (Confin-
dustria) a respectable 51 per cent. However, because 
20
ces papers - open forum # 10
 
 Lastly, while both countries had what are 
commonly labeled “intermediately” centralized and 
coordinated wage bargaining systems, the Italian 
system produced a far greater degree of wage com-
pression across sectors, regions, and categories of 
workers first as a result of the scala mobile, which 
from 1977 on increased compensation across sec-
tors by a common denominator for inflation (Locke 
and Baccaro 1999), and later by the important role 
of national sectoral bargains.   The Spanish bargain-
ing system, in which more workers are covered by 
bargains at the provincial-sectoral level than at the 
national-sectoral level and in which “inflation revi-
sion clauses” are dependent on collective bargains, 
always allowed more wage dispersion across re-
gions, sectors, and categories of workers. Coordi-
nation in wage bargaining, on the other hand, was 
principally achieved in both countries through peak-
level incomes policy guidelines that covered Italian 
wage setting since the early 1990s and wage bargains 
in Spain from 1977 to 1988 and again after 2001.
 The different sources of power and incentives 
faced by Italian and Spanish employers, unions, and 
governments are likely to have had an important im-
pact on the course of social model reform in the two 
countries. One way in which this can be observed is 
in the relative success of social pacts aimed at pro-
ducing social model change in the period prior to the 
crisis. As the following sections describe, that pro-
cess appeared far more successful in Spain than in 
Italy (where it repeatedly collapsed during periods 
of conservative government in 1998 and again after 
2001), undergirding many of the changes in the Span-
ish social protection regime described above.  The 
persistence of social bargaining in Spain prior to the 
crisis bespeaks differences in the reform dynamics 
of the two countries which suggest that the degree of 
similarity attributed to the two cases in the 1990s may 
have been more the effect of a particular historical 
vantage point than of persisting historical dynamics. 
2.1 Italy: From grand pacts to reform stalemate  
 The run up to monetary union began in Italy 
with a major political crisis, the result of a series of 
political trials for corruption and abuse of power that 
affected a wide gamut of the Italian political class. 
The crisis climate was reinforced when the Italian 
lira was forced out of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism a few months after the 1992 general elec-
tion. This prompted a period of social reform focused 
on wage moderation and pension cost containment, 
with some, albeit limited, attention to labour mar-
ket issues (contractual flexibility and ‘social shock 
absorbers’, i.e. income maintenance for the unem-
ployed)  forged through social pacts between the ma-
jor labor confederations and the technocratic govern-
ments that oversaw the  transition to a new electoral 
law in 1993.  The process of negotiated social reform 
continued up to the end of the 1990s (Locke and 
Baccaro 1999; Regini and Regalia 1997; della Sala 
2004), but it broke down once Italy’s participation in 
EMU was secured. Starting in the early 2000s, Ital-
ian governments unilaterally introduced labor mar-
ket reforms that increased the segmentation between 
labor ‘insiders’ and several  categories of ‘outsiders’, 
with varying levels of entitlement to social protection 
or none at all (see Breton et al. 2009; Sacchi 2013). 
 The dual economic and political crisis of 
Italy in the early 1990s created a context in which 
the national union confederations emerged as key 
strategic partners to the technocratic governments 
of the period seeking to reestablish Italy’s credibil-
ity (Regini and Regalia 1997; Negrelli 2011).  The 
collapse of the dominant Christian Democratic Par-
ty due to the “tangentopoli” scandals, the crisis of 
the Italian Communist Party, and the prospect that 
EMU membership might elude Italy following the 
ERM crisis all created a perception of emergency 
among unions and employers. This facilitated two 
important tripartite agreements: the first in 1992 
abolishing the scala mobile system of automatic 
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wage indexation; the second in 1993 creating a new 
and stable architecture for incomes policies and col-
lective bargaining (Regini 1996: 726; Perez 2000; 
2002).  The negotiation of the pacts also cemented 
a new period of inter-confederal union coopera-
tion, which had been a critical feature of the earli-
er period of political exchange from 1970 to 1984. 
 
 The abolition of the scala mobile represented 
a critical change in the Italian system of wage setting. 
Since the late 1970s, the mechanism had become 
a driver of both inflation and of wage compression 
across sectors and regions in Italy.  Because the wage 
adjustments dictated by the scala were so significant, 
they had come to dominate wage setting in the prior 
decade and therefore had rendered collective wage 
bargaining largely meaningless (Baccaro and Locke 
1996). The subsequent 1993 agreement created a 
new, two-level architecture for wage setting -- with 
national sectoral bargains (guided by overarching 
cross-sectoral incomes policy guidelines) setting 
minima and so called “proximity agreements” at ei-
ther the  company or local level (depending on the 
sector) setting productivity-linked upgrades.  This 
new, more orderly bargaining structure allowed both 
greater wage coordination and a rise in wage differen-
tials. Wage dispersion, however, continued to be lim-
ited by the fact that minimum wages continued to be 
negotiated at the national central level by employers 
and unions (Hancke and Hermann 2007; Molina and 
Rhodes 2009; Birindelli and d’Aloia 2008: 29-34).
 Following the transformative pacts on wage 
bargaining of 1992/93, the technocratic and Center-
Left governments of what came to be known as the 
Second Italian Republic sought to turn what had been, 
initially, a mechanism of emergency governance into 
a routine mode of policy-making based on concer-
tation with the unions. This model proved success-
ful in allowing Italy to gain inclusion in EMU, but it 
repeatedly broke down in the context of subsequent 
Right-wing governments. The first major pension re-
form (following the first Berlusconi government un-
successfully attempt to impose a unilateral reform) 
was passed by the government of Lamberto Dini in 
1995 and was largely based on the advice of union 
and Ministry of Labor experts. Although its impact 
on costs and liabilities was modest, it did bring about 
a shift from an earnings-based to a more contribution-
related PAYG system, standardized contributions 
across categories of employees (private, public and 
self-employed) and incentives for the use of fully-
funded supplementary pension schemes. Tripartite 
negotiations also produced a number of labor reform 
measures that sought to address the unprecedentedly 
high level of unemployment observed in the South 
(at 26 percent in ) and among youth (at 30 percent 
throughout the 1990s) during the 1993-1995 reces-
sion. These included the 1996 Patto per il lavoro and 
the 1997 reform of the labor market (Law 196/1997) 
also known as the pacchetto Treu. The pacchetto 
Treu represented the first major departure from an 
Italian tradition of labor law heavily focused on lim-
iting contract flexibility, as it allowed new forms of 
internal labor market flexibility (in particular work-
ing time adjustments to address cyclical fluctuations) 
as well as external flexibility, by expanding the scope 
for atypical (temporary and fixed-term contracts).  It 
was subsequently reinforced by the 2003 Biagi Re-
form - the first to extend the use of temporary con-
tracts throughout the private and public sectors. 
 The 1990s and 2000 also saw two attempts 
to create a minimum income of last resort scheme 
to address the problem of the working poor, a mea-
sure that might have shifted the traditional bias in 
social spending in Italy. Means-tested minimum in-
come schemes (reddito minimo di inserimento) were 
implemented in an experimental way from 1998 
through 2003 and again, for a subset of municipali-
ties across Italy, between 2007 and 2009, in both 
instances under governments of the Left (Boeri and 
Perroti, 2002; Sacchi and Bastagli 2005; Colombino 
2012)  Yet the Right repeatedly set back the clock on 
these effort when it returned to power in 2001 and 
again in 2008.  The last iteration of these repeated at-
tempts to extend social protection to cover labor mar-
ket outsiders prior to the Eurozone crisis occurred 
when the center Left government in the region of 
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Lazio tried to extend the minimum income program 
at the regional level without central government sup-
port in 2009, but the effort was abandoned again 
after the Right won the regional elections in 2010. 
 The electoral defeats of the Left by the Belus-
coni coalition (in 2001 and, again, in 2008) also paved 
the way for the breakdown of the social concertation 
process.  The last major tripartite pact on collective 
bargaining of the 1990s reached under the D’Alema 
government, the so-called ‘Christmas Pact’ of 1998, 
maintained the  principle of wage concertation based 
on the two-level bargaining structure agreed in 1993 
(Negrelli and Pulignano 2007).  But the second Ber-
lusconi government rejected the policy principle of 
“concertation” replacing it with a less binding notion 
of “social dialogue.” Though in the first tripartite pact 
reached under its tenure - the 2002 ‘Pact for Italy’- 
the government backtracked from its position by ac-
knowledging the role that concertation had played in 
allowing Italy to participate in EMU, it subsequently 
failed to deliver on the policy objectives agreed to 
with the unions – which included new income sup-
port measures for the poor and unemployed in return 
for more monitoring of work searches and increased 
public investment in the Mezzogiorno – in subsequent 
budget laws. The new social policy provisions of the 
2007 ‘Pact for Welfare’ signed between the unions 
under the Centre-left Prodi government in 2007 - 
which included flexibilization of eligibility criteria 
for pensions so as to cover more outsiders (Colombo 
and Regini 2011) - were also rescinded after the cen-
ter-right coalition came back to power in April 2008.
2.2 Spain: Social model reform in the context of 
a highly segmented Labor Market
  
 In the two decades leading up to the finan-
cial crisis, Spain’s social model underwent a number 
of important changes, many of which were agreed 
as part of bipartite and tripartite social pacts.  So-
cial pacts had played a critical role during the demo-
cratic transition of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
A founding pact  among political parties (Pactos de 
la Moncloa) served to contain the wage price spiral 
that took hold during the last stages of the Franco 
regime and set the base for a series of subsequent 
tripartite wage pacts. The effectiveness of this nego-
tiated incomes policy was enhanced by the provision 
in the 1980 Labour Statute that extended the appli-
cation of any bargain signed by any union meeting 
representativeness criteria in works council elections 
to all firms and workers in the sector or territorial 
level at which it was signed.  One of these pacts, the 
1983 Acuerdo Económico y Social (AES) - signed 
between the Socialist government of Felipe Gonza-
lez, the CEOE and the UGT (but not the CC.OO.) 
and covering wages for 1984-1986 – proved par-
ticularly important.  In it, the government and the 
CEOE agreed to increase the coverage of Spain’s 
underdeveloped unemployment benefits system and 
to raise minimum wages for youth in return for the 
UGT’s acceptance of the legalization of temporary 
work contracts (a concession that would lead to the 
profound dualization of the Spanish labour market 
thereafter) (Guillen 2010). The PSOE government’s 
refusal – following its second electoral victory in 
1986 - to compensate the Socialist confederation 
for these concession with further social policy mea-
sures led negotiations on incomes policy to unravel 
in 1988 (Perez, 2000).  During the following years, 
the UGT –which had delivered wage moderation to 
support the PSOE’s adjustment policies only to see 
unemployment rise above 20 percent and had suffer 
significant losses in works council elections - would 
join the CC.OO. in a far  more militant wage bar-
gaining stance to recoup its credibility. The social 
pact process that had underpinned the political tran-
sition would not recover until the PSOE’s electoral 
defeat by the right-wing Popular Party (PP) in 1996. 
 
 Several factors conspired to allow for a re-
launch of the negotiated reforms process following 
the 1996 elections. First, the two major labor con-
federations suffered a crisis of legitimacy as a result 
of the even more dramatic rise in unemployment that 
followed the ERM crisis of 1992 (Polavieja 1998). 
Both confederations came under new leadership that 
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recognized the negative fall-out of the militant bar-
gaining positions taken in the 1989-1994 period and 
were willing to take a more compromising stance. 
Secondly, the  new government of Jose Maria Aznar 
needed to strike a centrist tone (it was the first time 
the Right had come to power since the transition to 
democracy and it did not have an absolute majority) 
and embraced social pacts as a way to legitimize it-
self. Third, as the 1993/1995 recession came to an 
end and the Bank of Spain began to lower interest 
rates to converge with those of other EMU coun-
tries, Spain experienced a rapid economic recovery 
and a dramatic improvement in the government’s 
fiscal position, allowing the PP government to reap 
the benefits of the orthodox policies pursued by its 
predecessor and to back union concessions with 
policy rewards in a manner that the PSOE gov-
ernment had failed to do.  In 1996 it thus signed a 
landmark agreement (the Pacto de Toledo) with the 
unions that set in motion the gradual revision of the 
old age pension system, allowing Spain to achieve 
a far more sustainable pensions balance than most 
of its eventual Eurozone partners had at the time. 
 
 In April 1997,  it took further measures to sup-
port a pact between employers and the unions com-
mitting both sides  to seek national sectoral pacts in 
sectors not yet covered at that level and to establish 
procedures for the horizontal extension of collective 
bargains (across sectors within a territory).   This ef-
fort to seek greater coordination in wage bargaining 
through its centralization had limited success,  as the 
peak associations (in particular the CEOE) were un-
able to bring along lower level affiliates to consoli-
date bargaining at the national level in most sectors. 
But from 2001 on –in what may be seen as an effort 
compensate the failure of bargaining reorganization 
at the national-sectoral level – the unions agreed to 
return to national bi-annual wage negotiations with 
employers and to set global wage guidelines (Acu-
erdos Interconfederales sobre Negociación Colectiva 
(ANCs)) under which lower level negotiators were 
invited (though not bound) to increase wages in line 
with inflation and productivity (Herrmann 2005). 
 By contrast to Italy, where both pension re-
form and labor market reform (in particular fol-
lowing the 2003 Biagi reform extending the use of 
temporary contracts) remained mired in conflict, 
in Spain contention between governments and the 
unions centered more squarely on the latter, and spe-
cifically on the issue of employment protection for 
those on indefinite work contracts.  Seeking to recti-
fy the extensive use of fixed-term contracts, both the 
conservative Aznar government and the subsequent 
Socialist government of Rodriguez Zapatero that 
came to power in 2004 sought to reduce the resort 
to temporary contracts. Their strategy was to create 
new categories of indefinite labor contracts carrying 
lower dismissal costs and offering tax subsidies as 
incentives for employers to use such contracts.  Re-
ductions in labor taxes were also agreed (first as part 
of the 1997 social pact and again in 2002.  None of 
these reforms, however, managed to put a significant 
dent in the predilection of employers (not just private 
but also public administrations at various levels of 
government) for temporary work contracts. The ex-
traordinarily high proportion of employment on such 
contracts (illustrated in Figure 4, section 3 below) 
would only show a significant decline from 2009 on, 
when non-renewal of workers on temporary contracts 
was used as the first line of employment shedding. 
2.3 Explaining the Contrasting Reform Dynamics
 
 The political dynamics of social model re-
form in Italy and Spain produced some convergence 
in the area of labor market regulation with the exten-
sion of temporary work contracts in Italy during the 
1990s and 2000s.  But the political process did not 
allow for significant change in the structure of social 
spending in Italy, while it did do so in Spain.  As 
noted, pension reform coupled with increased spend-
ing on programs benefiting the working age popula-
tion allowed Spain to move its welfare state closer 
into line with the distribution of expenditure in other 
EU15 countries.  And Spain had developed a far more 
encompassing unemployment benefit system which 
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protected all categories of workers and provided a 
minimum benefits to workers on fixed-term contracts. 
 A number of factors help explain the contrast-
ing pattern of social model reforms in Spain in the 
decades prior to the crisis. Many of the changes im-
provements in social protection introduced in Spain 
were part of the social pact making process, which, 
as noted, broke down repeatedly in Italy.  This in it-
self can be linked to other factors.  We have already 
pointed out the opposite political contexts: the pre-
dominance of minority governments in Spain versus 
the majoritarian turn in Italian politics following the 
1993 electoral reform.   Three further differences were 
also important. The first is the sharply different fiscal 
position of the state, which allowed Spanish govern-
ments to support agreements between employers and 
hamstrung Italian governments, in particular those of 
the Left, in their efforts to reform the Italian social 
model.  After the economic adjustment effort that 
the last Gonzalez governments imposed to keep the 
peseta in the ERM, Spanish governments were able 
to support pacts between employers and unions with 
fiscal resources, a significant contrast with continu-
ous pressure to bring expenditures under control on 
Italian governments in their efforts to scale back Ita-
ly’s persistently high public debt. Thus, while Span-
ish social pacts focused (as elsewhere in Europe) 
on regulatory trade-offs, there were also significant 
examples of distributive bargains - including public 
investment, tax relief, renegotiation of the minimum 
wage (by more than 30 per cent in 2004), as well as 
pension reform concessions to the unions (in 2001 
and 2007), in return for their support for a stronger 
contributory element in the PAYG pensions system 
and for private complementary pensions.  Such quid 
pro quos helped Spanish governments secure ongo-
ing union commitment to wage moderation and facil-
itated agreement on changes in labor market reform 
(Rodríguez Cabrero 2002; Molina and Rhodes 2007). 
 Although the divergence in social model re-
forms in Italy and Spain can be dated back to the 
early 1990s (or even the 1980s, with the revamping 
of the unemployment insurance system), the leeway 
Spanish governments had to support distributive 
bargains relative to their Italian counterparts was 
vastly augmented following monetary union. The 
two countries joined the Euro with very different 
macro-economic fundamentals and, given the Euro-
zone economic constitution which emphasized pub-
lic debt and deficits  without creating mechanisms to 
compensate asymmetric growth and financial flows 
in the Eurozone, this set off very different dynamics 
in the two countries.  Spain entered the union with a 
particularly low public debt burden and a regulatory 
framework that allowed for a very high level of labor 
market dualism and, implicitly, flexibility of employ-
ment creation.   It thus experienced a decline in inter-
est rates without any demand for compensatory fiscal 
restraint coming from the Eurozone  (given that its 
public debt position was far better than that of core 
Eurozone countries prior to the crisis). This spurred 
a rapid expansion of credit by Spanish financial insti-
tutions and investment concentrated in non-tradable 
sectors (notably construction) that was financed in-
directly by  large private savings flows from the Eu-
rozone’s core economies  via the Eurozone’s inter-
bank lending market and purchases of Spanish loan 
backed bank securities by other Eurozone banks. 
 The result was a real estate bubble that even-
tually proved disastrous for the Spanish economy. 
Yet while it lasted, the boom in domestic demand 
encouraged a very strong pace of labor force acti-
vation (in particular of women) and spectacular em-
ployment growth. This facilitated the pattern of so-
cial policy change which moved Spain away from 
the traditional familial male-breadwinner model 
with which it was associated in the VOC literature 
and considerably closer to the social policy regimes 
of more employment friendly Northern EU econo-
mies.  By contrast, in Italy, which joined the Euro 
with a particularly high public debt burden, govern-
ments struggled to meet the Eurozone Growth and 
Stability Pact objectives after entry.  Although EM 
lowered the risk premium on Italian public debt 
and allowed some employment growth (as well as 
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price rises in non-tradables sectors), the ongoing 
need to reduce public debt in compliance with the 
GSP underpinned a period of limited government in-
vestment and extended low growth through the first 
decade of the currency union. This general context 
undercut repeated efforts by governments of the 
center-Left to shift the balance of welfare spending 
in ways that might have encouraged further labor 
force activation and more significant pension reform.
 Secondly, while Spanish unions managed to 
converge on a strategy of moderation and accom-
modation after the mid-1990s and to maintain their 
unity in action, the main Italian labor confederations 
saw deepening divisions in the 2000s. This can part-
ly be attributed to the fact that the pay-offs to unity 
in the form of government quid pro quos  were so 
meager in Italy and to the fact that Spanish govern-
ments became more committed to social pacts after 
the early 1990s when attempts by the PSOE govern-
ment to go it alone proved to be counter-productive. 
But unity between the labor confederations and 
their commitment to a strategy of accommodation 
in Spain also fit the unions’ need to broaden their 
constituency to the growing and very large num-
ber of workers on temporary contracts, which con-
stituted the majority of workers in some sectors, 
such as construction and in the public sector. This 
altered the nature of ‘insider-outsider’ dynamics in 
Spain more than it did Italy, allowing employment 
regulation to become a topic for social pact bargain-
ing. Meanwhile, in Italy, the return to power of the 
Berlusconi coalition in 2001 against the background 
of majoritarian electoral reform and party-system 
transformation brought with it a more confronta-
tional style by governments of the Right and this 
increased tension among the labor confederations. 
 
 Lastly, to some extent the far-reaching re-
form of the wage bargaining system in Italy in the 
early-to-mid 1990s and the subsequent institutional 
embedding of wage moderation took care of one 
of the most critical reforms for both unions and 
employers (the former gained greater control of 
the system, while the latter secured the end of in-
flationary wage claims, even if they wanted further 
reforms to enhance wage flexibility). Thus, a major 
bone of contention and the most compelling issue 
for social bargaining by Italian governments and 
employers was removed. In Spain, as noted,  the 
collective bargaining centralization foreseen in the 
1997 Pacts remained incomplete.  This, in addition 
to other factors (including the unions’ goal of pre-
venting a further decentralization to the firm level 
where their presence, at best, was very weak) helped 
produced the annual bipartite ANCs (Acuerdos para 
la Negociación Colectiva) which set national cross-
sectoral pay parameters from 2001 on.  This bipar-
tite overarching wage setting framework helped 
to sustain the broader process of social bargaining 
well past the onset of the economic crisis in 2008. 
3. Social Models and Economic Performance 
under EMU
 The austerity cum labor market liberalization 
centered approach pushed on Spain and Italy by their 
Euro partners have been premised on the assump-
tions that social model characteristics played a major 
role in landing both countries in the external finan-
cial positions that rendered them susceptible to con-
tagion during the sovereign debt crisis.  Even when, 
as in the case of the IMF (2013) and more indirect-
ly the EU Commission (Bontout and Lokajickova 
2013), there have been acknowledgements that the 
pace of budgetary restriction may be undercutting 
the utility of liberalizing labor market reforms and 
contributing to the very outcomes they are meant 
to address (economic and labor market stagnation, 
public deficits and financial sector vulnerability), 
these same institutions (and in the case of the EU, 
the Eurogroup) have insisted that the pace of labor 
market and spending reform be kept up or even tak-
en further as a way to facilitate the internal devalua-
tion that is offered as the only way out of the crisis. 
 What role social model features (i.e. social 
protection and labor market regulation patterns) 
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played in contributing to the situation of the two 
creditor countries, however, remains very unclear. 
The argument (when it is spelled out) usually refers 
to excessive borrowing and loss of competitiveness 
as measured by the evolution of unit labor costs in 
relation those of Germany, linking these phenomena 
to the deteriorating current account positions the two 
countries in the run up to the crisis  but without much 
analysis of the sources of this deterioration. Labor 
market failures such as the phenomenally high level 
of unemployment in Spain since the outbreak of the 
crisis and that of youth unemployment in Italy are 
typically attributed to persisting rigidities that keep 
those markets from clearing. Although concessions 
have been made that there are other market failures 
at play (most notably the faulty transmission of mon-
etary policy in the Eurozone to creditor countries 
as reflected in the much higher cost of credit faced 
by firms in the latter) the fundamental demand that 
the pace of labor market liberalization and spend-
ing reform be altered so as to allow adjustment via 
internal devaluation has been maintained in inter-
governmental negotiations within the Eurogroup. 
 This section takes up the question of the role 
of social model features in the economic performance 
of the two countries following the launch of the Euro 
and in the course of the crisis. I first review various 
performance indicators before turning to the question 
of the likely contribution of social model features in 
light of other factors impacting the economic perfor-
mance of the two countries. Looking first at growth 
rates, Figure 2 illustrates the dramatically different 
experience of the two countries in the decade leading 
up to the financial and sovereign debt crises.  While 
Italy, with the brief interlude of 2000-2001, experi-
ence consistently low growth in the decade leading 
up to the crisis (averaging 1.6% from 1999 to 2007 
compared to the Eurozone’s 2.3 average), Spain 
joined the Eurozone at a time when it was begin-
ning to experience an economic take-off and grew 
consistently well above the Eurozone at an average 
annual rate of 3.7% over the same period.   After 
2008, Spain experienced a considerable contraction 
Figure 2: GDP Growth rates (Source: Eurostat) 
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(adding up to 5.6% of its GDP from 2008 through 
2012).  Italy experienced a short acute recession from 
2008 to 2010, falling back into recession in 2011 and 
a cumulative contraction of 6.9% from 2007-2012
Turning first to the most common indicator of labor 
market performance – the unemployment rate –the 
contrast between the two countries could not be 
starker. Spain’s has been marked by extreme fluctua-
tion over the last two decades, from a first high of 24 
per cent in 1994 down to 8 (right around the Euro-
zone average) just prior to the crisis, and up again to 
a record 27 percent at its height in 2013, before eas-
ing back to 26  per cent.  This rise, as some have sug-
gested, appears quite disproportionate to the actual 
contraction in Spanish GDP over the period.  Italy’s 
unemployment rate also varied considerably but far 
less so than Spain’s, from 12.3 percent in 1998 down 
to 6.8 percent in 2008 and up to 12 percent by the 
end of 2013.  On the other hand, a common feature of 
both countries is their persistently high youth unem-
ployment rates (age group of 15-24), which has been 
well above the EU15 average throughout the period. 
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Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in the case of Spain 
youth unemployment has conformed to the general 
rule in the EU (with the notable exception of Germa-
ny) in that it tends to double the overall unemploy-
ment rate and, thus, appears to be a function of that 
overall rate. In Italy, by contrast, youth unemploy-
ment has tended to exceed general unemployment by 
a higher multiple (a more than 3 to 1 ratio in 2012). 
 
 However, because both Italy and Spain also 
experienced very significant demographic change 
during the decade prior to the Eurozone crisis - through 
1) immigration (of around 2 million into Italy and 5 
million into Spain according to official figures) and 
2) change in female labor force participation -- unem-
ployment rates are not in fact a very good measure of 
labor market performance.  It is far more informative 
to focus on employment rates which show the number 
of job holders relative to the working age population. 
 As illustrated in Figure 3, both Italy and Spain 
experienced very considerable employment growth 
during the first decade of EMU right up to the eco-
nomic crisis.  That employment growth, nonetheless, 
was particularly pronounced in Spain where jobs 
increased by almost 6.5 million from 1999 to 2007 
(compared to 2.5 million in Italy). Indeed, employ-
ment growth in Spain was so strong up until the crisis 
that it accounted for more than 40 percent of all jobs 
created in the Eurozone to 2007.   The rise in overall 
employment rates also reflected significant increases 
in the employment rates of women in both countries 
(Figure 4). Again, this phenomenon was much more 
marked in Spain, which saw a rise in the employment 
rate of working age women from 41 percent in 1999 
to 56 percent in 2008 (compared to a rise from 40 
percent to 47 percent for Italy over the same period). 
The dispersion of regional employment rates (espe-
cially for women) also declined in Spain consider-
ably more than in Italy during this period,  leading 
some sociologists to argue that Spain had undergone 
a definitive turn from the family/kinship to the du-
al-earner family model (Naldini and Jurado 2013).
   
Figure 3:  Employment to Population Ratio (OECD Labour Force Statistics iLibrary, May 2013) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Employment rates by Gender (OECD iLibrary, May 2013) 
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Figure 4: Employment rates by Gender (OECD iLibrary, May 2013) 
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Employment trends in the two countries follow-
ing the onset of Europe’s financial crisis proved 
equally disparate, with the drop in employment 
of Spanish men being, by far, the most dramatic 
(down from 76 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 
2012 (compared to a drop from 58 to 54 per cent 
for women).  Indeed, the number of women em-
ployed in Spain continued to rise until 2009, when 
the Zapatero government began to implement aus-
terity measures.  In Italy the decline in the employ-
ment rate was less than 1 percent for both men and 
women up to 2009, limited to 3% by 2012 for men 
and negligible for women.  Nevertheless, at the 
end of 2011, the Spanish economy still employed 
over four million more people than it had in 1990, 
and virtually all of that difference was accounted 
for by the rise in female employment. However, 
two years later, after two labor market reforms to 
ease dismissal conditions in 2011 and 2012 (see 
next section), it had seen the loss of a further mil-
lion and a half jobs (figure for third quarter 2013). 
 Lastly, Figure 5 illustrates the dualism in 
both labor markets, including the exceptionally high 
levels of temporary employment in Spain, already 
in place at the end of the 1980s.  In spite of a series 
of regulatory changes to encourage a reduction in 
the use of such contracts by firms, only the end of 
the housing boom in 2007 and the sharp downturn 
of the economy following the Global Financial cri-
sis would truly result in such a reduction as tempo-
rary jobs were first to be shed.  The Italian figures 
show a significant rise over the period but without 
reaching the EU average. Nevertheless, it is note-
worthy that in the period since the start of the crisis, 
a full 58% of new jobs created in Italy have been in 
the form of temporary or other atypical contracts.
  
Figure 5: Share of temporary employment in total employment 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Turning to distributional outcomes, statistics on in-
equality paint a complex picture.  Both countries 
started the EMU period with relatively high inequal-
ity measured in terms of the 80/20 income quintile 
share ratio (4.9 in Italy and 5.7 in Spain), although 
Italy had the very lowest income dispersion level 
in the Eurozone when measured in terms of the 9th 
to 1st decile share ratio (2.2).  Italy’s 80/20 quintile 
share ratio increased modestly but steadily through 
the 2000s, reaching a ratio of 5.2 in 2010, while 
Spain’s declined during the construction boom, but 
deteriorated sharply thereafter. By 2010, with a 
quintile share ratio of 6.9 and a Gini coefficient of 
.34, Spain displayed the greatest rise in inequality 
within the Eurozone for the crisis period. The dra-
matically high level of unemployment was clearly 
the prime factor behind this particularly acute rise 
in inequality. But wage dispersion, as noted, has 
also been consistently higher in Spain than in Ita-
ly and increased significantly as the economic cri-
sis dragged on (OECD Employment Outlook 2012; 
Banco de España November 2012).  On the other 
hand, while neither country can be said to have 
done well in protecting vulnerable income groups, 
the reallocation of social spending did allow Spain 
to have a still modest but significantly larger impact 
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in poverty reduction than the Italian welfare state. 
Thus, while  the at-risk-of-poverty rates after trans-
fers in Italy was, at almost 20 percent in 2012, only 
4 percent lower than the pre-transfer proportion, in 
Spain it was, at 22 percent, 7  percent lower than the 
pre-transfer proportion that year (not very different 
from the level in Germany for instance) (Eurostat). 
 Lastly, there is the performance of the two 
economies in terms of competitiveness measures. 
Much attention has been paid to the relative rise of 
unit labor costs of the Eurozone periphery coun-
tries in the period leading up to the sovereign debt 
crisis and in the role this played in the rise of these 
countries’ current account deficits during the period 
(see for instance Dadush 2012; Sinn 2013). Both 
phenomena, and the connection between the two, 
are central to the view that the fundamental prob-
lem of adjustment in the Eurozone is one of com-
petitiveness and that social model changes are criti-
cal to rectify this problem.  This view also serves 
as an implicit justification for the position that in-
ternal devaluation by way of regulatory reforms 
intended to reduce labor costs was the only way to 
resolve the crisis and that such adjustment via inter-
nal devaluation had to be achieved as a precondition 
for macro-institutional changes in the Eurozone.
   
 Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of the Real 
Effective Exchange Rate (a measure that takes into 
account developments in each country’s main trad-
ing partners) of Italy and Spain based on their unit 
labor costs. It shows that, but for a brief period of 
depreciation up to 2001, the Eurozone as a whole 
experienced a significant appreciation of its REER, 
with Spain and Italy mostly trailing the Eurozone’s 
overall development until 2005 and then experienc-
ing somewhat higher ULC growth in Spain, followed 
by a considerable depreciation (internal devaluation) 
in Spain following the start of the crisis that was 
clearly not matched in Italy. Indeed, that internal de-
valuation of ULC is likely to have been much greater 
than the graph indicates, as aggregate compensation 
figures in Spain were artificially inflated after 2007 
by the fact the share of low wage jobs declined far 
more dramatically than that of higher wage jobs. The 
actual reduction in wages behind the figures is thus 
estimated to have been approximately twice as much 
as the such aggregate compensation figures indicate 
(Bank of Spain, Economic Bulletin, February, 2014).
Figure 6: Index of Real Effective Exchange Rate, ULC based (2005 = 100 ), IMF International Financial 
Statistics 
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 The role that social model features played in this 
growth, competitiveness and labor market perfor-
mance picture, however, is far from clear. The mat-
ter is complicated by the fact that monetary union 
implied a major macro-economic shock for both 
countries because it altered the course of monetary 
policy by bringing interest rates down to those of 
core countries and, at the same time, encouraged a 
significant intensification of financial integration in 
the Eurozone area (Obstfeld 2013). At the same time, 
other factors affecting domestic demand, such as the 
leeway for public investment or for growth of pri-
vate credit differed greatly between the two countries 
given their very different public debt positions and 
the Growth and Stability Pact’s exclusive focus on 
public debt. 
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economies starting as early as 1998 (when their cen-
tral banks began to lower their prime rates to con-
verge with the Eurozone average),  the need for con-
tinued fiscal consolidation to address the public debt 
in Italy meant that the effect of the monetary policy 
change was much larger for Spain because it fed into 
a process of economic recovery that was already un-
derway. As lower interest rates in Spain coincided 
with a continuing decline in public debt (and hence 
created greater room for private borrowing), they set 
off a prolonged demand-driven growth cycle centered 
in the construction and real estate sectors.  With em-
ployment rising, more people were able to move into 
the labor market and therefore also into the housing 
market.  Women, long punished by decades of high 
unemployment (due, in part, to  Spain’s earlier ortho-
dox fiscal and monetary policies) had acquired high 
levels of educational qualifications and were particu-
larly well primed to enter the labor force in large num-
bers (ergo the 20 percentage point rise in their labour 
force participation rate in just a decade).  Spain’s rap-
idly expanding labor market also attracted large num-
bers of immigrants (many of whom found work in the 
construction sector) producing a demographic boom. 
Demographic growth, low interest rates and rising 
employment drove housing prices and, by way of the 
wealth effect, further fed private borrowing. In Italy, 
by contrast, lower interest rates appear to have made 
some contribution to domestic demand in the imme-
diate period after 1998.  But this effect was quickly 
muted by the continued need to reign in public sec-
tor debt following an initial, short post EMU boom. 
 The main difference in the demand profiles 
of the two countries was on the side of investment 
(rather than consumption), specifically in commer-
cial and residential housing investment and in capi-
tal formation.  Housing investment in Spain rose 
at a very fast rate – so much so that housing starts 
topped those of the three largest economies in the Eu-
rozone (Germany, France and Italy) taken together 
in the last years of the boom (Estrada et al., 2009: 
p.35 ).  Investment in in ‘other construction’ was 
also considerably higher (by over two percent) than 
 
 The run-up to monetary union involved large 
fiscal adjustment efforts in both Italy and Spain. Yet 
the “fundamentals” emphasized by the Growth and 
Stability Pact with which the two countries joined 
the Euro were far apart, in particular their public 
debt positions.  One reason for this had to do with 
the 1992/93 ERM crisis.  In the case of Spain, which 
had relatively low public debt even at its height in the 
1990s, the central bank and the Socialist government 
of the time chose to pursue all necessary measures to 
keep the Spanish peseta in the ERM and avoid the fate 
of the Italian lira and the British pound, which were 
forced out of the mechanism.  One consequence of 
this was the first dramatic surge in unemployment re-
ferred to above, to almost 25 percent in 1994.  In the 
case of Italy, which faced the ERM crisis with a far 
worse public debt position, the employment conse-
quences of that crisis were more limited because the 
lira’s exit and large devaluation afforded relief for the 
corporate sector.  The orthodox course of the Socialist 
government in Spain – coupled with a series of con-
trolled devaluations of the peseta within the system 
and the much lower accumulated public debt burden 
- allowed for a very successful fiscal turnaround. The 
primary deficit was cut to 2 percent as early as 1997 
and would continue a steady decline from there on, 
leaving Spain in primary budget surplus territory for 
much of the 2000s.   Italian governments imposed 
large budget cuts from 1996 to 1999, lowering the 
government’s annual deficits from 6 percent to a low 
of 0.8 percent in the year of EMU entry. But their 
failure to bring the large public debt –most of it ac-
cumulated in the pre-1993 “First Republic” period 
- into line with the Stability and Growth pact meant 
that fiscal policy remained continuously constrained 
following monetary union, a fact that only exacerbat-
ed the standoff over social model reform in the 2000s. 
 The different public debt positions with which 
Italy and Spain joined the Eurozone meant that the 
effect of the move to a single monetary policy on 
domestic demand was of a different order. Though 
EMU brought a reduction in interest rates for both 
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in these three other economies.   The boom in Spain 
also had a self- reinforcing character in that it both 
drove and was fed by the large scale demographic 
impact of immigration - itself driven by job growth. 
It may have been further facilitated by a liberaliza-
tion of land zoning laws carried out by the first Aznar 
government, by tax incentives encouraging home 
ownership, and by the failure of the Bank of Spain to 
reign in the lending of regional savings banks to the 
real estate sector. However, in evaluating the role of 
these other factors it is important to keep in mind that 
without the lower interest rates and the rise in loan-
able funds coming through the Eurozone’s interbank 
market following monetary union, the Spanish real 
estate bubble could never have developed as far as 
it did.  Indeed, it would not have been possible with-
out two much larger developments in the Eurozone: 
1) the mismatch between ECB policy (set largely to 
match the different output-gap scenarios of core Eu-
rozone countries, notably Germany and France) and 
domestic demand conditions in Spain (or, for that 
matter, in Ireland, which experienced very similar 
consequences), and 2) the financial imbalance cre-
ated by the rise in the German national savings rate 
from 2002 onwards, which played a key role in fi-
nancing the Spanish bubble through the interbank 
Eurozone market (on this point see Pettis 2012). 
 Figures 7a and 7b show the evolution of out-
put gaps for Spain and Italy in comparison to their 
two largest Eurozone trading partners (Germany 
and France) before and after the crisis. As 5a illus-
trates, Spain and Italy joined the Euro with different 
output gap positions (quite negative in Spain, posi-
tive in Italy), largely because Spain had suffered a 
much stronger recession after 1992. Between 1999 
and 2001, all Eurozone countries experienced a short 
boom bust cycle, and France and Germany entered 
negative output gap territory in 2002 lasting to 2006. 
Figure 7a: Output Gaps up to crisis (percentage of GDP)…… 
 
Source: IMF, Word Economic Outlook Database, May 2013  
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Figure 7b: ….and from 2007 on  
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 During this period the ECB refinance rate 
became very accommodating (see Figure 8), in par-
ticular as most Eurozone economies (including Ger-
many, France, and Italy) were unable to meet the 
Stability and Growth Pact deficit objective.  While 
this scenario persisted, Eurozone banks in slow-
er growing economies (principally Germany and 
France) directed excess savings towards other Euro-
zone countries (much of it through interbank lend-
ing and purchases by German and French banks of 
Spanish bank issued covered bonds).  Although other 
factors restrained investment in Italy, the output-gap 
figures suggest that ECB policy was also quite ac-
commodating for the Italian economy, which also 
saw considerable financial inflows, although these 
were directed largely to Italian public debt.  Then, 
as Germany and France re-entered positive output 
gap territory in 2006, the ECB raised rates (Figure 
8) and kept them up until 2009 coinciding precisely 
with the Global Financial Crisis. This step precipi-
tated the very fast collapse of the Spanish real es-
tate market (which was based on variable rate loans 
linked to the Euribor) and the crisis of the Spanish 
savings banks with the heaviest exposure to that 
market. In Italy, the dynamic was different as easy 
money had flowed mostly into government bonds 
prior to the crisis, lowering the public debt burden 
but without producing the private investment boom 
observed in Spain. Nonetheless, up until the crisis 
inflows of funds from surplus countries helped ease 
the financial burden of the still large public debt that 
Figure 8.  ECB Refinance Rates 
 
Source: ECB 
 
would prove Italy’s Achilles heel during the sover-
eign debt crisis.  
It is critical to keep in mind this macro-econom-
ic backdrop in considering what role social model 
features may have played in the economic perfor-
mance of Italy and Spain – and in particular that of 
their labor markets - before and after the crisis.  The 
different demand scenarios not just between Italy 
and Spain, but between Spain and most of the rest 
of the Eurozone up to 2007 is particularly impor-
tant in understanding the economic boom and out 
of the ordinary employment growth in Spain.   By 
2007, the construction sector accounted for almost 
twice the share of GDP (11 %) as in the rest of the 
OECD (5.6%), and a much larger share of employ-
ment (13%) than the rest of the Eurozone (7.7%). 
By contrast in Italy, the size of the construction 
sector closely reflected the Eurozone averages, ac-
counting for 5.4% of GDP and 7.7% of employment. 
 With this macro-economic backdrop in mind, 
we can consider arguments that are commonly of-
fered for how social model features may have con-
tributed to the economic outcomes Spain and Italy 
experienced following monetary union and to the vul-
nerable position they found themselves in during the 
sovereign debt crisis.  Chief among these outcomes 
are 1) the much larger labor activation and employ-
ment growth experienced in Spain prior to the cri-
sis, in particular by women, 2) the far more dramatic 
employment destruction in Spain in the course of the 
crisis compared to relative employment stability in It-
aly, 3)the growth in ULC both countries experienced 
up to the crisis, and 4) the much faster internal deval-
uation in Spain compared to Italy and 5) the failure 
of this devaluation to stem the fall in employment. 
 Focusing first on the different employment 
and growth performance in the years leading up to 
the crisis, we have already noted the key difference 
in macroeconomic fundamentals with which the two 
countries joined the Euro and the extraordinary de-
mand boom to which the single monetary policy con-
tributed in Spain. Employment growth was also sup-
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ported in Spain by the fact that, as we shall see below, 
labor compensation growth remained quite modest 
considering the high GDP growth rates, though this 
was also true in Italy. These factors are likely to ac-
count for the bulk of the difference between the two 
countries. Nonetheless, one difference in the two 
countries social model features – the ease with which 
employers could expand temporary employment in 
Spain – could also have played an ancillary role. 
 First, it is clear that the Spanish employment 
regime allowed for very fast employment creation as 
soon as monetary policy took a less orthodox turn. 
The fact that the proportion of temporary employ-
ment to overall employment nonetheless did not 
rise very much suggests that, at least during the eco-
nomic growth period, temporary employment did ef-
fectively work as a stepping stone towards indefinite 
employment.    The years (2003-2007) in which the 
ratio did increase as a result of the particularly in-
tense expansion of the construction sector were ones 
in which the “wealth effect” of rising housing prices 
had already taken hold (so that people invested in 
real estate for its expected appreciation) and during 
which the mismatch between ECB interest rate poli-
cy and conditions in Spain was particularly acute (as 
suggested by the output gap data).  We can therefore 
venture the conclusion that the flexibility afforded 
by temporary contracts in Spain is likely to have 
interacted with the very particular macro-economic 
context so as to feed, rather than restrain, the impact 
of those macroeconomic conditions on employment 
growth and on the allocation of resources to the con-
struction and real estate sectors during this period. 
 As regards the particularly strong pace of 
female labor force activation during this period in 
Spain compared to Italy, it is again probable that 
overall macro-conditions, in this case coupled with 
the considerable investment in advanced education 
by women during the prior decade of high unem-
ployment, played an important role. A quickly ex-
panding labor market with inbuilt mechanism for the 
integration of newcomers in the form of fixed-term 
contracts following a period in which women had 
invested more heavily in higher education than men 
provided fertile ground for a large rise female labor 
force participation.  However, as we have seen, so-
cial policy in Spain also had shifted in a more acti-
vation friendly direction during the previous decade. 
The introduction of non-contributory pensions and 
social assistance benefit, the expansion of unem-
ployment insurance to temporary workers, univer-
sal free childcare from age 3, the 2006 Dependency 
Law, and the expansion of educational opportunities 
were all factors that facilitated female independence 
from family networks and entry into the labor mar-
ket.   Both factors, the change in social protection 
and a labor regulation regime that was particularly 
permissive of fixed-term employment, were missing 
in Italy at least until in 2003.  But so, of course, was 
the fast pace of economic growth and employment 
expansion that Spain experienced prior to the crisis. 
Moreover, many of the new social protection poli-
cies preceded the sharp rise in women’s labour force 
participation. Thus, both the social model changes 
and the fast economic growth thus seem to have been 
needed to bring the social transformation to fruition. 
 However, if the combination of macroeco-
nomic conditions and social model change in Spain 
lent themselves to a particularly strong rate of labor 
force activation (in particular by women) during the 
economic boom, it also facilitated the very dramatic 
employment shedding the country experienced once 
the ECB began to raise interest rates from 2006 to 
2009 and the Global Financial Crisis hit. The total 
decline in employment (18% over the 2008-2012 pe-
riod) was far out of line with the degree of economic 
contraction in GDP (5.6% over the same period).  As 
the decline in the proportion of temporary workers 
in Figure 4 above illustrates, fixed-term employees 
bore the brunt of the burden of that adjustment as 
they could be cycled out of the labor force at virtu-
ally no cost at the end of their short contracts.  To be 
sure, a very large proportion of these workers were 
concentrated in the construction sector, which saw a 
total contraction of employment of 50% in the first 
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few years of the crisis.  But the same phenomenon 
occurred in other sectors as the Spanish economy en-
tered a generalized recession in 2008 that it would 
not recover from for the following five years.  Be-
tween the second quarter of 2008 (when total em-
ployment peaked) and the last quarter of 2013 em-
ployment declined almost continuously.  Of the 3.7 
million jobs lost in the period, approximately 58% 
was accounted for by the net loss of temporary jobs 
early on, with the decline in indefinite contracts 
starting later and following a much steadier path. 
 By contrast to Spain, the employment con-
traction in Italy and concomitant rise in unemploy-
ment was far more limited (1.15 million) even 
though Italy experienced a higher cumulative con-
traction of GDP over the period (6.7%).  Again, one 
important reason is macroeconomic. Italy did not 
have the type of overgrown construction sector that 
accounted for such a large share of the employment 
contraction in Spain.  Two other features, both re-
lated to social model characteristics, however, must 
also have been important. First, with a less dualized 
labor market, Italy simply did not have the same 
bulk of temporary workers that could be cycled out 
of employment at low cost at the end of their con-
tracts.   Secondly, as the next section will discuss, 
the absence of a conventional universal system of 
unemployment benefits led Italian governments and 
social actors to expand on existing non-market based 
institutions that provided for effective work-time 
sharing.  One consequence of this different response 
is that Italy, at least up until the Fornero labor market 
reform of 2012, managed to protect employment at 
the expense of the type of internal devaluation ef-
fected in Spain through employment contraction and 
increases in productivity per hour worked (Figure 8). 
 This brings us to the question of the role that 
social models may have played in contributing to 
the much touted loss of competitiveness of the two 
countries vis à vis core Eurozone economies (prin-
cipally Germany) either through their effect on labor 
costs or through their effect on productivity growth. 
Here it is useful to start with the usual caveat that 
competitiveness as applied to countries (rather than 
firms) is a rather ill-defined concept and that there 
is no agreement on how it is best measured. Rela-
tive costs as reflected in real effective exchange rates 
based on unit labor cost (ULC) data (Figure 6) are 
the most frequent measure. But a country’s share in 
world trade in relation to its GDP is sometimes seen 
as the more fundamental measure. The two are not as 
closely correlated as might be thought because trade 
share is influenced by many factors other than ULC. 
It is, in any case, well understood that trade share (or 
exports) depend on external developments at least 
as much (when not more) than on country attributes 
subject to regulatory manipulation (Krugman 2001). 
 Nevertheless, much attention has been paid to 
the rise in the unit labor costs of Eurozone periphery 
countries relative to Germany in the period leading up 
to the sovereign debt crisis and in the role this played 
in the rise of these countries’ current account deficits 
during the period (Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010); 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2011). Both phenomena, 
and the connection between the two, are central to 
the view that the fundamental problem of adjustment 
in the Eurozone is one of   competitiveness and that 
social model (labor market and pension system) fea-
tures are at the core (or at least crucial sources) of this 
problem (see for instance, Sinn 2013;  Boltho and 
Carlin 2013; European Commission 2012, pp. 17-22).
 Arguments postulating that social model fea-
tures contributed to the rise in relative unit labor costs 
that Italy and Spain experienced following monetary 
union can be divided into two categories: those that 
suggest these features result in excessive growth in 
worker compensation and those that suggest they 
may contribute to inadequate productivity growth. 
Foremost among the first category is the view that 
labor market dualism allowed labor market insiders 
to set wages in light of their strong employment pro-
tection because they could assume externalities to be 
born by temporary workers (Bentolila and Dolado 
1994).  A different argument focuses on the degree of 
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coordination in wage bargaining across sectors and 
suggests that countries lacking strong export-sector 
leadership or cross-sectoral coordination were bound 
to loose competitiveness in the Eurozone once unions 
in sheltered sectors no longer felt that their national 
central banks would raise interest rates if they ob-
tained excessive wage increases(Johnston, Hancke 
and Plans 2013).  Both types of arguments directly 
and indirectly (in the latter case) justify the heavy 
emphasis among the troika’s demands for reforms 
on reducing employment protection for permanent 
workers and on weakening the position of unions in 
the collective bargaining process by decentralizing 
bargaining to the firm level (see the next section). 
 Arguments linking social model features to 
low productivity growth, on the other hand, tend to 
focus on the ways in which such features may impede 
skill formation or productivity enhancing invest-
ment by employers. On the one hand, high employ-
ment protection may act as a disincentive for labor 
market insiders to engage in continuing training. 
On the other hand, as has been posited by political 
economists drawing on the distinction elaborated by 
Becker (1963), employment security (either in the 
form of high social spending or employment regula-
tion) is a critical requirement to encourage people to 
invest in the kind of firm specific skill investment that 
is seen in high productivity growth countries (Este-
vez-Abe et al. 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001). It 
also creates strong incentives for employers to make 
productivity enhancing investments either through 
training or through capital and technology invest-
ments (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999; Pischke 2004). 
 Some scholars have called attention to an ab-
sence of strong vocational training or continuing edu-
cation system either at the firm level or above in Spain 
and Italy (Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn 1998; Amable 
2003; Molina and Rhodes, 2007).  It is very difficult 
to obtain good comparative data on the skill intensity 
of countries that actually measure training outcomes. 
However, the best available data on training systems 
for the two countries does not support the view that 
this is a clear distinguishing feature of the Spanish 
and Italian economies.  The fact that both countries 
managed considerable improvements in some of 
their human capital measures over time also suggests 
that skill formation is not particularly dependent on 
social model features such as employment protection 
or labor market dualism. Indeed, if we consider that 
both dismissal costs for indefinite workers and so-
cial protection in Spain were higher than in Italy, but 
Spain managed to improve its human capital mea-
sures more than Italy, these results do not support the 
view that high employment protection for indefinite 
workers or a dualized labour market in itself reduced 
investment in skill formation. If anything, they would 
lead us to the opposite conclusion as we would, in 
fact, expect from the political economy literature. 
 However, a different way in which social 
model features – and specifically the regulatory lee-
way allowed for temporary employment in Spain 
and increasing in Italy – may have affected produc-
tivity is by contributing to the pattern of sectoral in-
vestment in the two economies. It is possible that a 
regulatory regime offering a particularly high level 
of flexibility at the margins coupled with high dis-
missal costs for individuals on indefinite contracts 
might skew investment towards sectors that are not 
intensive in sector specific skills or in high skills. 
 
 Of course, as we have seen, Spain saw par-
ticularly high growth and employment in the rela-
tively low wage/low productivity construction sector 
following monetary union. It is possible that the low 
regulatory barriers to temporary employment cou-
pled with high dismissal costs associated with per-
manent contracts fed into the decision by large inves-
tors to allocate resources to the construction sector as 
they made investment in sectors requiring relatively 
little investment in training and development of hu-
man capital (compared to sectors requiring more de-
velopment of sector specific skills) more attractive 
relative to sectors requiring more training. The fact 
that employment growth in Italy in the period fol-
lowing the Biagi reforms also became more concen-
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trated in low skill sectors (construction; real estate 
renting and business activities; employment in pri-
vate households, tourism and retail trade) does sug-
gest that the liberalization of temporary work might 
create such a bias in sectoral growth patterns. Still, 
such a bias would have pre-dated the Spanish hous-
ing and real estate booms by almost two decades. 
There is thus little doubt that the boom and the asso-
ciated shift in the sectoral composition of the Spanish 
economy (far more accentuated then the one in Italy) 
was produced in a first order by the combination of 
low public borrowing (which allowed more room for 
private borrowing) and the macroeconomic shock 
of monetary union, with the dualism in employ-
ment regulation playing perhaps and auxiliary role. 
 There are other reasons to be doubtful that 
social model features played a central role in Italy 
and Spain’s loss of competitiveness during the first 
decade of monetary union. It will do to start with a 
few observations on labor costs. Figures 9a and 9b 
show annual growth in compensation per employee 
for industry and for the economies as a whole. It sug-
gests that there was no clear contrast between the 
evolution of compensation in the two countries verus 
the Eurozone at large, except in the period imme-
diately surrounding the world financial crisis when 
compensation growth in Italy and Spain shot up tem-
porarily above the Eurozone average and then quick-
ly corrected. Compensation growth for the economy 
as a whole remained below the Eurozone average for 
Spain prior to the crisis, and somewhat above for Italy 
only for some years. Other labor cost data also do not 
support the view that labor costs were a distinguish-
ing feature.  Annual real wage growth for the period 
2000-2007 show growth of 0.1 percent for Spain and 
0.8 percent for Italy compared to 0.9 percent for Ger-
many and an average of 1.1 percent for  the EU15. 
For the period 2007-2010, the average  annual 
growth was of 1.9 percent for Spain, 0.3 percent for 
Italy, 0.2 percent for Germany and 0.9 percent for the 
EU15 (OECD Employment Outlook 2012, p. 242). 
As for the uptick in compensation immediately 
following the world financial crisis, an alysis of the 
Spanish data by the Bank of Spain (2014) shows 
that it was due to a composition effect, reflecting 
the rapid contraction in lower wage temporary 
jobs in low wage sectors, which shows up as a 
rise in per employee compensation in the aggre-
gate figures.  Net of this composition effect, real 
wages declined in the period from 2007 to 2009.  
The same is likely to be true of the Italian data, 
given that employees on lower wage atypical work 
contracts bore the brunt of job losses.  Indeed, in 
the Spanish case the compositional effect on wage 
statistics was so strong that the Bank of Spain 
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Figure 9a Percentage annual growth in Compensation per employee in Industry (OECD) 
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position of growth, specifically the disproportionate 
growth of employment in lower productivity sec-
tors. It is well recognized that in the case of Spain 
the drop in aggregate labor productivity was largely 
due to the disproportionate growth of employment 
in such low productivity sectors as construction, real 
estate and business services (Estrada et al. 2009). 
This composition effect also becomes apparent 
with the sudden rise in aggregate labor productiv-
ity in Spain once employment in these sectors sec-
tor collapsed.  It is noteworthy that in Italy, despite 
the absence of a housing price bubble, employment 
growth following the Treu and Biagi reforms (which 
increased the room for temporary, lower cost train-
ing contracts) was also concentrated in these very 
same sectors, so that the lower aggregate productiv-
ity measure may also reflect changing sectoral com-
position of employment in the economy. Again, as 
already noted, if social model features contributed to 
these sectoral growth patterns, it was primarily by 
allowing room for the creation of lower cost tempo-
rary or atypical jobs rather than by the high cost as-
sociated with indefinite employment, which should, 
if anything have worked as a productivity whip. 
The presumption that the causes of relatively low 
productivity growth were inherent to the social 
models of the two countries, is, in any event, also 
challenged by firm-level data which reveals that 
productivity growth in both countries was highly 
dependent on firm size, with larger firms in Spain, 
in particular, showing productivity growth that not 
only matched but outperformed that of other Euro-
zone firms in their sectors and size categories (Rodri-
guez et al. 2012;  BBVA 2012; Amatori et al. 2011; 
Pagano and Schivardi 2003).   If we are to look for 
supply side factors to explain aggregate productiv-
ity trends, it would thus make more sense to look at 
the determinants of firm size in the two countries.
  
 
stipulated in early 2014 that the actual fall in com-
pensation between 2008 and 2012 was likely twice 
that indicated by the aggregate figures shown below 
(Bank of Spain, Economic Bulletin, February 2014). 
 It is difficult to conclude from this data that 
there was any particularly strong role played by wage 
setting institutions in the deterioration of relative 
unit labor costs during the run-up to the crisis. Cu-
mulative wage growth in neither country outstripped 
that of Germany prior to the crisis and far less that 
of the Eurozone as a whole. The data also reveals 
two other things. First, the sharp decline in employee 
compensation growth rates starting in 2001 in Spain 
coincides with the re-initiation of global wage pacts, 
suggesting that Spanish unions did have a very con-
siderable capacity for wage coordination even in the 
midst of a great economic boom (see also Nonell et 
al. 2006). Secondly, the rise in labor compensation 
observed in Italy from 2004 on occurred during a pe-
riod in which concertation had largely broken down. 
On the other hand, Spain’s overall lower growth in 
employee compensation compared to Italy in spite of 
much higher GDP growth may be due to the higher 
share of temporary employment in that country. Yet 
neither this element of labor market flexibility (and 
of dualism, of course) nor Spain’s higher productiv-
ity growth or lower labor cost growth (prior to 2007) 
relative to Italy prevented the unbalanced growth dy-
namic that resulted in the employment boom and bust. 
Indeed, if anything it facilitated that boom and bust. 
 If not wage dynamics, can the pace of pro-
ductivity growth be attributed to social model fea-
tures in the two countries?  As Figure 10 reflects, ag-
gregate labor productivity per hour worked grew at 
a lower rate than the Eurozone average in both Italy 
and Spain in the period prior to the crisis. Indeed, 
it is this relatively low rate of productivity growth, 
rather than developments in compensation, that ac-
counts for the low higher growth in aggregate ULC 
in Italy and Spain compared to the Eurozone aver-
age.  However, there is good evidence that these ag-
gregate figures reflect changes in the sectoral com-
20
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 The most important reason to doubt the con-
ventional competitiveness story linking current ac-
count developments to social model features in 
Southern European countries (including Italy and 
Spain), however, comes from analyses that disaggre-
gate the evolution of aggregate Unit Labour Costs in 
the two countries both by sectors and by their price 
versus cost components.  As Gaulier and Vicard 
(2012) show, ULC developments in the two countries 
(as well as other Eurozone debtor countries) did not, 
in fact, reflect the kind of negative trade performance 
one would expect if the competitiveness thesis were 
right.  Nor were the cost and price performance of the 
Italian and Spanish tradables sectors a direct cause of 
the two countries’ deteriorating current account posi-
tions (or rising current account deficits). Looking at 
bilateral export developments for Eurozone countries 
in the period leading up to the crisis, disaggregated 
by product categories, their analysis shows that once 
geographical and sectoral specialization effects are 
accounted for, the export performance of Southern 
Eurozone countries was in fact quite good compared 
to the rest of the Eurozone in the 1999-2007 period. 
The “export push” (export performance not attribut-
able to developments in export pull factors) of Italy 
(as well as Greece and Portugal) was “similar to that 
of Germany, with export market share losses below 1 
Figure 10: Labour productivity annual growth (OECD) 
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percent yearly.”  Spain’s was actually better, “partly 
offsetting a negative geographical and sectoral spe-
cialization.”  This also helps explain the paradox that 
Spain was the Eurozone country that suffered the 
second smallest loss in its world export share (sec-
ond only to the Netherlands and with Germany in 
third place) from 1999 to 2011  (Cardoso et al., 2012). 
 The link between aggregate ULC and the 
rising current account deficits of Spain and Italy (as 
well as the other peripheral countries) during the 
period was not driven by labor costs or productiv-
ity growth in the tradables sector.  But neither was 
it driven by wages in non-tradables, as the alterna-
tive thesis advanced by Johnston, Hancke and Plans 
would have. Gaulier and Vicard (2012) use EU-KL-
EMS data to disaggregate ULC growth rates not just 
by sectors but also to distinguish the “between” and 
“within” components of ULC growth for both wage 
share and price deflator in each sector. The exercise 
shows that it was the dynamic of prices in non-trad-
ables feeding through the debtor country economies 
that accounts for the bulk of the deterioration in ag-
gregate ULC.   This combination of rising aggregate 
ULC due to price developments in non-tradables 
on one hand, and a good (cost and price based) ex-
port performance by Eurozone creditor countries 
on the other relative to creditor countries is, as the 
authors put it, the “signature” of a demand shock 
rather than a “competitiveness” shock.   And this 
demand shock from EMU can be explained by the 
increase of financial flows into Southern Eurozone 
countries following EMU given the combination of 
lower interest rates  and increased confidence (Lane 
and Pels 2012; Lane and McQuade 2013).  German 
banks played a particularly important role in this 
regard through their purchases of Spanish and Ital-
ian bonds (in particular mortgage backed bonds is-
sued by Spanish banks (see WSJ June 27, September 
24, 2012; European Commission 2012b, pp.47-53). 
 Gaulier and Vicard’s analysis thus points to 
much larger dynamics within the Eurozone involv-
ing demand shifts between countries that created 
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powerful incentives for financial flows into non-trad-
able sectors in the poorer Eurozone countries. Tak-
en together, these observations raise serious doubts 
about the prevailing view that Italy and Spain’s prob-
lems in the Eurozone can be attributed to their social 
model features, with the possible exception of a re-
inforcing effect coming from the ease of temporary 
employment in Spain and the growing room for atyp-
ical work in Italy. The widespread acceptance of the 
competitiveness thesis – and its attribution to social 
model features – nevertheless has served to justify 
important changes in labor market regulation and so-
cial expenditures in both countries.  As the next sec-
tion describes, these changes have been more radi-
cal in Spain than in Italy given different institutional 
starting points and domestic political scenarios. 
4. Consequences of the Eurozone crisis 
While neither Spain nor Italy featured prominently 
in the onset of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
that began with the dramatic loss of confidence in 
Greek public finances in the fall of 2009, by the sum-
mer o f 2010, both countries came under heavy pres-
sure to adjust their responses to the crisis and their 
regulatory models in line with guidelines from EU 
actors. The announcement of the details of the Eu-
rozone’s EFSF bailout fund in May 2010 proved an 
important trigger in this regard.  It confirmed that 
the German government opposed fundamental insti-
tutional changes such as any mutualization of pub-
lic debt through mutually guaranteed Eurobonds or, 
for that matter, the transformation of the ECB into a 
real lender of last resort for banks and governments. 
As the EFSF was authorized to raise only  250 bil-
lion euros beyond those needed for the already an-
nounced Irish and Portuguese bailouts – far too 
little to address a likely banking bailout in Spain or 
speculative attack on Italian debt – talk of a potential 
break-up of the Eurozone and of currency re-con-
version risk began to be taken seriously by markets. 
 
 
 Both countries became subject to sovereign 
debt crisis contagion following the May 2010 sum-
mit because they were deemed to be too large to be 
bailed out under the terms of the new fund and be-
cause it seemed, at this time, that they had no lender 
of last resort. Bond spreads on Italian and Spanish 
public debt experienced their first serious spikes im-
mediately after the announcement EFSF package and 
rose significantly over the following year, peaking 
repeatedly in the second half of 2011 above the level 
deemed the limit of viability (although never rising 
to the point of the Greek, Irish, or Portuguese levels). 
 
 Given the lack of support from Brussels, and 
more importantly, the ECB at the time, this forced 
governments in both countries to accept austerity 
measures in 2010 and 2011, as demanded by Brus-
sels, in order to assuage bond markets. By the end 
of that second year, incumbents had fallen in both 
countries as a result of their perceived inability to 
tackle the economic crisis, but not before institut-
ing emergency fiscal and labour market measures 
that were applied under pressure from the Eurogroup 
and the ECB.  In Italy, the parliamentary coalition 
backing the Berlusconi government broke down 
principally due to Berlusconi’s inability to persuade 
the Northern League to impose the type of pen-
sion reform that had been demanded in an August 
2011 letter from the ECB - co-signed by then Bank 
of Italy head Mario Draghi - and reinforced by the 
Commissioner Olli Rehn  (Sacchi 2013). In Spain, 
the Zapatero government capitulated in the face of 
growing public pressure after having imposed aus-
terity measures and a first labour market reform in 
line with demands spelled out in a similar letter from 
the ECB (again, co-signed by the head of the national 
central bank) sent at the same time as the letter to 
the Italian government.   The prime minister called 
early elections for November 2011 in which the 
PSOE was thoroughly defeated by the conservative 
PP, principally because it lost much of its vote share 
to third parties (including, prominently, the United 
Left). Spain would eventually sign a memorandum 
of understanding with the Commission that involved 
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sion of credit to the real estate sector by these banks 
had been financed largely through interbank flows of 
savings in the core Eurozone countries (both via the 
interbank wholesale market and through purchases of 
debt issues by Spanish banks by foreign – primarily 
German and French – banks). The international cred-
it crunch of 2008 stopped that flow of funds through 
the Eurozone’s banking systems to Spanish financial 
institutions. The end of the construction boom pro-
duced massive job shedding in the construction and 
real estate services sectors, real estate credit defaults 
and ultimately the socialization of banking sector 
losses in 2011-2012. Although Spain obtained an 
EFS credit line to support its banking sector bailout, 
once concern over so-called “re-denomination” risk 
spread in 2010 (following the Germany’s refusal to 
contemplate a move to joint liability for government 
debt  (Eurobonds) at a May EcoFin summit that year), 
Spain was left as vulnerable as Italy to sovereign debt 
market contagion in spite of its still good public debt 
position at the time. This vulnerability would persist 
following the banking sector bailout loan Spain ob-
tained in 2012 because of Germany’s refusal to allow 
direct recapitalization of banks via the EFSF, mean-
ing that the debt incurred to recapitalize the banks 
had to be added to the Spanish public debt (which 
in turn hurt the credit rating of Spanish banks that 
held much of this debt on their balance sheets).
 
 The sharp drop in domestic demand in 2008 
led unemployment to skyrocket in just two years 
from 8 percent (where it stood at the end of the boom 
in 2007) to 19% percent at the end of 2009, 22.9 per 
cent at the end of 2011 (just prior to a major labor 
market reform), and a phenomenal 27% in early 2013 
(following a second labor market reform).  That con-
traction in the job market meant a rapid rise in credit 
delinquencies in particular for the regional savings 
banks that were most exposed to the real estate sec-
tor. The flow of interbank credit to these banks from 
the rest of the Eurozone came to a virtually complete 
halt. Coming at the very same time as a major drop 
in tax income (from the collapse of the real estate 
market) and rise in unemployment outlays (given the 
further pension and labour market reforms in order 
to obtain a credit line to recapitalize its banking sec-
tor in July 2012, whereas Italy was able to avoid any 
formal agreements. Nonetheless, economic policy in 
both countries from 2010 on was carried out under 
the pressure of “stringent and pervasive” condition-
ality from the ECB, the Eurogroup, and the Com-
mission, even if this conditionality was informal. 
  
 One striking feature of the ECB and Euro-
group demands in the cases of Italy and Spain is just 
how similar the measures pushed on the two govern-
ments were given that Italy’s weakness lay principal-
ly in its record of slow growth and inability to curb 
its public debt while the Spanish one derived princi-
pally from the high level of private debt (both house-
holds and corporate) which, in the face of collapsed 
domestic demand, threatened the situation of the 
banking sector.  In both cases, European institutions 
demanded a liberalization of the labor market via a 
reduction in employment protection for workers with 
indefinite contracts and a faster pace of old age pen-
sion reform than had been agreed among domestic 
actors. As we shall see later, in spite of the similarity 
in the measures pushed by external actors, Spain was 
far more susceptible to that external pressure than 
Italy given different institutional and domestic polit-
ical scenarios. Spanish governments thus advanced 
along the path dictated by the Eurogroup much faster 
and further than did Italy.   However, before looking 
at the pattern of regulatory responses in each country 
and at how these matched up with external demands, 
it is important first to understand the ways in which 
the Global financial crisis and subsequent the Euro-
zone sovereign debt crisis affected each economy. 
 
 Reflecting the divergence in their economic 
dynamics over the previous decade, the sources of the 
two countries’ vulnerability to the credit crunch that 
followed from the GFC and to contagion during the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis were quite different. 
In Spain, that vulnerability derived principally from 
the consequences of the sudden collapse in domestic 
demand and rise in unemployment for Spanish banks 
most exposed to the real estate market.  The expan-
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fairly developed nature of the Spanish unemploy-
ment protection system), the contraction of private 
credit had to be matched by an increase in the public 
deficit and rise in the public debt. Although that pub-
lic debt had fallen to just 36 per cent of GDP prior to 
the crisis and remained low compared to almost all 
other Eurozone countries well through the end of the 
decade, the speed of its rise after 2008 and the expec-
tation that the public sector would have to bail out 
the banking sector constituted the principal weak-
ness in the eyes of international debt markets.  This 
expectation increased as austerity measures applied 
from 2010 on failed to produce a rapid turnaround 
but rather fed the vicious circle between rising un-
employment, unemployment outlays, credit defaults, 
banking sector vulnerability, growth in the public 
debt, rise in interest rate spreads, and lack of external 
sources of private credit.  That cycle was mitigated 
only by the eventual actions of the ECB (its 2012 
announcement that it would take action to support 
the Euro and announcement of the OMT program). 
 
 By contrast to Spain’s boom/bust scenario, 
the Italian economy experienced a much smaller 
contraction in employment during the post-2008 eco-
nomic crisis, even though the contraction in its GDP 
would be greater than that of the Spanish economy. 
The unemployment rate in Italy rose by a mere 1 per-
cent during 2009 to 7.8 percent and still stood at 8.9 
percent two years later in December 2011, then rising 
to 12.5% in 2013.  This, combined with far lower lev-
els of household debt, meant that the Italian economy 
did not become as caught up in the kind of private 
sector centered doom loop we observe in Spain. The 
vulnerability of the Italian economy derived rather 
from the still very high level of public debt, much 
of it held in the balance sheets of Italian banks. The 
sheer size of that debt in spite of steady decline up 
until the Eurozone crisis (it remained above 100% 
of GDP in 2008), meant that it rose significantly (be-
yond 120 percent of GDP by 2012) once spreads to 
the German bund began to rise and in spite of early 
austerity measures.  Combined with the perceived in-
ability on the part of the Berlusconi coalition to reign 
in that debt, this landed Italy squarely in contagion 
territory following the May 2010 EcoFin summit. 
 One contrast between the two countries that 
nonetheless requires explanation is that in their labor 
market performances. Considering the relative size 
of their GDP contractions over the period 2007 to 
2013 (a cumulative 6.9% for Italy compared to less 
than 4.7% for Spain),  the size of job losses in Spain 
appears hugely disproportionate.  Three things need 
to be kept in mind in understanding this paradox. 
First, the rise in the Spanish unemployment rate must 
be seen in light of the big rise in the labour force 
that took place during the growth years (given the 
large rise in female labor force participation (which 
continued into the crisis) and the 11 percent demo-
graphic growth produced through immigration over 
the prior decade).   Italy’s labour force also grew, 
but not as dramatically given its considerably lower 
participation rate (62 percent compared to Spain’s 
74 percent for those of working age at the end of 
2012). Secondly, unemployment in Spain had a very 
strong sectoral component, being heavily concen-
trated in the construction sector, at least until 2011, 
while Italy did not experience the same kind of sec-
toral employment boom and bust that Spain did in 
the real estate sector.   Third, although temporary 
and “atypical” jobs  accounted for the bulk of the 
job losses in both countries (90 per cent of net job 
losses in the 12 months to June 2009 in Spain, and 
47 per cent in Italy), such contracts accounted for a 
much greater proportion of employment in Spain.  It 
is clear that the prevalence of temporary work con-
tracts  allowed employers to reduce their work forces 
at very high speed in Spain and that there simply was 
not the same bulk of such contracts in Italy to allow 
a similar response.  Indeed, the high proportion of 
employees on temporary contracts made personnel 
cuts an immediate and rather low cost response to 
recession in Spain (OECD Economic Outlook 2009). 
 Differences in government responses, how-
ever, also played an important role, as Italy’s unem-
ployment rate would have been substantially higher 
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without that country’s wage compensation scheme 
(Cassa Integratione de Guadani or CIG),  which pre-
served the employment relationship between firms 
and workers made redundant, and which became 
one of the pillars of the Berlusconi governments re-
sponse to the crisis.  When taken together with the 
contrast in the evolution of relative unit labor costs 
- with Spain showing a fast recovery in labor pro-
ductivity per hour worked as unemployment rose 
while Italy’s unit labour costs continued to rise, it be-
comes clear that Spain increased productivity at the 
cost of job shedding, while Italy was more successful 
at protecting employment in the midst of severe re-
cession while avoiding the internal devaluation pre-
scribed as the way out of the crisis. This difference 
can largely be attributed to contrasting regulatory 
responses to the crisis described in the next section. 
 
4.1 Government responses to the Crisis in a 
context of external conditionality
 In both countries, governments initially at-
tempted countercyclical measures to maintain em-
ployment. The specific policy mix in the two coun-
tries, however, differed as governments built on 
different existing institutions.  The Socialist govern-
ment of Rodgriguez Zapatero raised spending on 
public infrastructure and financed a series of em-
ployment initiatives by regional governments.   In 
line with its more developed unemployment insur-
ance and social assistance record, it also introduced 
a new monthly euro 420 payment for those who had 
exhausted their unemployment benefit. At the same 
time it pushed employers and labor unions to agree 
to labor market reforms intended to reduce the dual-
ism in the labor market.  In Italy, the Berlusconi gov-
ernment passed a one-time special social assistance 
bonus to families with children and low-income 
pensioners for 2009. Far more significantly, howev-
er, was the expansion of Italy’s long standing wage 
guarantee fund – the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, 
CIG – which ensured continuity of income and em-
ployment of temporarily laid-off workers. The num-
ber of those covered by the scheme increased by 
311 per cent from 2008 to 2009 (thereby also reduc-
ing the number of unemployed workers consider-
ably).  However, as in the past, it remained limited 
to those on indefinite contracts who also enjoyed 
more generous unemployment benefits in the form 
of the so-called “mobility allowance” (Rhodes 2011). 
 
 These efforts at countercyclical stimulus 
policy, however, were soon undercut by the course 
of austerity taken by Germany and the stance of the 
ECB, which, while cutting its prime rate, remained 
far more conservative than the US Federal Reserve. 
In the case of Spain, the large fall in tax revenues 
caused by the end of the construction boom coupled 
with rising unemployment outlays drove the public 
deficit for 2009 above 10 percent and produced a 
significant rise in the interest rate spread on Span-
ish public debt following the May 2010 announce-
ment of the EFSF package.  Although Spain’s public 
debt, at 60 percent of GDP in 2009, remained low 
compared to that of Germany and other Eurozone 
states, the sharp rise in the deficit, coupled with the 
high level of private debt and rising defaults  soon 
raised questions about the stability of Spain’s bank-
ing sector. Speculation that Spain might be in line 
for default on its public debt if the banking sector – 
lacking a lender of last resort - had to be rescued by 
the government became the prime concern.   In the 
case of Italy, the problem pushing the country into 
center stage of the Eurozone crisis in early 2010 was 
the persistence of low growth and the increasing at-
tention paid by international bond buyers to internal 
conflict in the Berlusconi government over efforts 
to cut public spending, in particular pensions.  The 
still very high public debt, which was also concen-
trated in Italian banks’ balance sheets, and questions 
regarding its sustainability became the center of at-
tention. Both scenarios – that of a looming bank-
ing sector collapse in Spain and that of the Italian 
government’s failure to cut its public debt – played 
out in the context of growing speculation about the 
Eurozone’s  underlying structure (and the apparent 
unwillingness to provide more extensive fiscal back-
ing manifested in the German government’s rejec-
tion of proposals for the issuance of Eurobonds). 
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 By the spring of 2010, both governments 
were thus forced to change course and abandon their 
stimulus efforts in favor of austerity and structural re-
forms. In Spain, the Zapatero government was forced 
to agree to important austerity measures at the Ex-
traordinary Summit of the EcoFin in May. That same 
month it announced a 5 percent cut in public employ-
ee pay, a freeze on pensions and public public sector 
pay through 2011, and 15 billion euros in spending 
cuts to be applied in 2010  (NYT  May 12, 2010).  In 
June it announced a labor market reform that 1) ex-
tended the use of “permanent employment promotion 
contracts” (indefinite contracts carrying dismissal 
costs of  33 days wages per year rather than the stan-
dard 45 days in the case of unjustified dismissals), 
2)  made it vastly easier for firms to carry out “objec-
tive” dismissals (which carried only 20 days pay for 
dismissal costs) that could be justified before a judge 
based on technical or production related reasons, and 
3) introduced a mechanism whereby dismissal costs 
could be subsidized up to 50% through a public fund 
previously used only to pay severance costs for firms 
undergoing bankruptcy.   To seek to balance this re-
duction in employment protection for permanent 
workers, it also limited the use of consecutive tem-
porary contracts for the same employee to 24 month 
and  limited contracts “for a specific job or services” 
to a maximum of 3 years  (a restriction it  nonetheless 
suspended a year later as employment situation con-
tinued to worsened).   In late 2010, the government 
also initiated an extensive reform of the pensions sys-
tem, announcing the gradual deferment of the ordi-
nary retirement age from 65 to 67 years in late 2010. 
 And in May 2011, it began to impose sharp 
austerity measures in public spending.  These included 
the freezing of pensions (previously adjusted for in-
flation), higher deductibles on prescription coverage 
by the National Health Service, the abolition of a Euro 
2,500 tax deduction for the birth or adoption of a child. 
The government also imposed an across the board in-
crease in income taxes and a 5% increase in VAT. 
 
 The 2010 labor market reform and cuts to so-
cial spending - which prompted a general strikes by 
the unions in September 2010 - were designed in close 
consultation with the EU Commission and intended 
to fulfill a commitment made to its Eurozone partners 
to cut the deficit to 3 percent of GDP by 2013. The 
same was the case with a subsequent reform in July 
2011, implemented by decree, which altered the col-
lective bargaining framework so that firm level bar-
gains could abrogate minimum salary, work hours, 
occupational categories and work hour distribution 
conditions established in higher level bargaining 
(provincial-sectoral, regional, or national-sectoral). 
The main purpose of this reform was to calm inter-
national markets, given that negotiation between em-
ployers and unions on the matter had not produced 
an agreement.  Rising unemployment and unemploy-
ment outlays, however, made this a difficult course to 
chart. While productivity per hour worked rose dra-
matically following the contraction of the construc-
tion sector (in contrast to all other Eurozone countries 
were productivity growth declined), unemployment 
went on to top 22 percent in 2011. The dismal situa-
tion forced Zapatero to call early election while at the 
same time continuing to tighten austerity measures, 
setting the stage for the PSOE’s electoral defeat 
by the Popular Party that year in November 2011. 
 In Italy, the Berlusconi government similarly 
launched a decree to ‘create financial stability and pro-
mote economic competitiveness’ following the May 
2010 EcoFin summit, imposing cuts of  24.9 billion 
euros over 2010-2012 in an effort to reduce the pub-
lic deficit from 5 to 2.7 per cent of GDP.   It suspend-
ed all renewals of collective agreements in the public 
sector for 2010–2012, imposed a freeze on public 
sector salaries until 2013, and placed a 3.2 per cent 
ceiling on wage agreements in the private sector for 
2008–2009 that applied retroactively to agreements 
signed before the decree. In addition, all government 
department budgets for fixed-term employees (except 
in research and education) were cut to 50 per cent of 
their 2009 levels for the year 2010.  The government 
also used the crisis to accelerate the introduction of 
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pension reforms already on the agenda (but facing 
formidable political opposition). Retirement benefits 
were postponed by 12 months after reaching pen-
sionable age, the pensionable age was scheduled to 
be adjusted according to changes in life expectancy 
from 2015 on, and the pensionable age for women in 
public administration was increased from 61 to 65 
years, to start in 2012.  In spite of these measures, 
a decline in the tax base over the 2010-2011 period 
kept the government from meeting its deficit goals.
 In the face of a series of sharp spikes in the 
spread on Italian public debt in August 2011, the 
Berlusconi government came under intense pressure 
from the ECB, which sent a letter to the government 
(signed by Trichet and then Bank of Italy head Mario 
Draghi) demanding it advance the date for a balanced 
budget from 2014 to 2013 and that it pass further la-
bor market and pension reform as conditions for the 
ECB’s purchases of Italian public debt in secondary 
markets via the expansion of its LTRO mechanism. 
The Zapatero government, it was later revealed, 
was simultaneously sent a similarly co-signed letter, 
which prompted the Socialist government to speed 
through a constitutional amendment – with the sup-
port of the PP - committing Spain to limit any struc-
tural budget deficits to those authorized by the EU, 
both at the national and regional level, and capping 
them at 0.4% of GDP from 2020 onwards. In Italy 
(though not in Spain) the letter was leaked to press, 
and the Corriere della Sera (September 29, 2011) de-
scribed its content as a veritable “government pro-
gram”.  The government responded to the ECB letter 
by passing a further package of cuts by decree aimed 
a producing a balanced budget by 2013. But it could 
not agree to the ECB and Commission demands on 
“seniority pension” reform, which was opposed by 
the Northern League as such pensions primarily af-
fected one of its core constituency: large company 
employees concentrated in the North (see Sacchi 
(2013) for a more detailed description of the nego-
tiations between the government and its Eurogroup 
partners and of the tensions within the coalition).  The 
upshot was the collapse of the Berlusconi coalition 
and the prime minister’s resignation following the 
passing of a budget law for 2012 in November 2011. 
 The new governments of Mario Monti in Italy 
and of the PP, headed by Mariano Rajoy, in Spain, in 
turn, used the extraordinary circumstances in which 
they came to office to push for more aggressive pen-
sion and labor market reforms as demanded in the 
August 2011 ECB letters, at the same time attempt-
ing to use their new legitimacy to demand greater 
flexibility on the fiscal front from Eurozone core gov-
ernments.  Right upon taking office, the new Monti 
government passed a 30 billion euro emergency aus-
terity package at the end of 2011 that included a num-
ber of tax increases (VAT and property taxes), cuts 
in health spending and a rise in the state pension age 
to 66 (It was subsequently raised to 67 for all work-
ers as of 2021 and made subject to further revisions 
based on the evolution of life-expectancy).  This was 
balanced by a 5 billion euros package of measures 
to increase investment in infrastructure (in particular 
in the South, where employment shedding had been 
greatest). In February 2012 the Monti government 
also approved a package of measures to deregulate 
services (including taxi licensing, local transporta-
tion, and increased price competition in pharma-
cies, petrol stations, health care and legal services). 
he single most significant measure as regards the 
character of the Italian social model, however, was 
the July 2012 labour market reform, named for the 
Labour Minister Elsa Fornero, which involved two 
particularly important changes: it altered the legal 
framework  of  employment protection for workers 
on indefinite contracts in companies with more than 
15 employees (the most protected category of work-
ers under Article 18 of the Italian Workers Statute 
of 1970) and included a significant reform of unem-
ployment income protection. The latter consisted of 
the abolition of existing unemployment pay schemes 
and the introduction of a universal unemployment 
benefit regime (Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego, 
or ASPI), although only after two full years of con-
tribution, phasing out the exiting closed unem-
ployment and mobility allowances (Sacchi 2013). 
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 In Spain, the Rajoy government, in turn, be-
gan its tenure in December 2011 by announcing a 
further 15 billion euro austerity program, including 
6.9 billion euros in tax hikes (in income taxes for 
middle to high income earners, property, and capital 
gains taxes) and 8.9 billion in spending cuts falling 
largely on public employment (in particular in health 
care and education) (El Pais, December 30 2012). 
Much attention focused at this point on the regions. 
The Zapatero government had successfully reduced 
the contribution of the central government to the pub-
lic deficit, but it was not able to enforce a similar con-
traction in spending by the regions (which accounted 
for approximately 36 percent of total public spending 
and were in charge of most social spending beyond 
the social security (pension) system).  At the end 
of 2011, international credit rating agencies down-
graded the public debt of several regions and in mid-
January 2012 Standard and Poor’s imposed a further 
2 point cut of Spanish national debt based on the 
state of its regional debt. Meanwhile, the Eurogroup 
leadership demanded that the Rajoy government 
maintain the Zapatero governments’ commitment to 
reduce overall public deficit to 4.4 percent in 2012. 
 
 The new government responded with a pro-
gram of drastic cuts worth over 15 billion euros on 
regional government receipts, in spite of intense op-
position from regional governments controlled by the 
PP (as well as those controlled by the PSOE), which 
decried the pro-cyclical effect social cuts would 
have.  Following a private meeting with Merkel in 
late February, Rajoy finally announced that his gov-
ernment would not meet the promised overall defi-
cit reduction in 2012 because of the impact that this 
would have on the economy. But it did announce a 
radical labor market reform package (see more be-
low) to placate international rating agencies and 
its Eurozone partners (El Pais, February 29, 2012). 
 While the Zapatero reforms carried out by de-
cree were criticized by both unions and employers, 
they had reflected an underlying consensus among all 
parties that the overuse of temporary contracts had 
favored a trend towards low-cost, low value added 
jobs that needed to be reversed.   The labor market 
reform announced by the Rajoy government in early 
February of 2012 – following yet another failure of 
unions and employers to reach an agreement - went 
considerably further to assuage European partners, 
leading both the unions and the opposition to ac-
cuse the government of seeking to take advantage 
of the crisis to shift the balance of power in favor 
of employers.   The most controversial measure in 
the package  was the redefinition of the conditions 
under which companies could dismiss  workers and 
have the dismissal be considered “objective”  or 
justified (with dismissal costs limited to  20 days 
pay per year and a maximum of 12 month pay). 
The February decree allowed companies to dismiss 
workers under this modality by simply showing a 
drop in sales or revenues (no matter how small) for 
three consecutive trimesters. In the case of collective 
dismissals, it eliminated the need for firms to wait 
for administrative approval, and required judges to 
deem such lay-offs justified as long as the company 
could show the three semesters of revenue decline. 
The decree also altered the long-established prin-
ciple of “ultra-activity” by which the conditions of 
collective bargains remained in force as long as no 
new bargain had been reached. This qualitatively al-
tered the balance of power between labor and em-
ployers, as it left unions with the choice of agree-
ing to a new bargain within a 2 year time frame or 
face the prospect of leaving workers without any 
contract (El Pais, 10 February 2012).   The reform 
package re-established the two year limitation on 
the  use of consecutive temporary contracts for the 
same individual (which had been introduced by the 
Zapatero government but then suspended), but at the 
same time made it much cheaper for employers to 
offer part-time jobs, a modality that given the  uni-
versal subsidized child care system had never been 
extensively employed in Spain. The unilateral re-
form of employment conditions was followed in the 
announcement in the summer of 2012 of  a second 
package of austerity measures, worth 65 billion euros 
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to be carried out over two years, including a second 
increase in the VAT and an across the board cut in 
the number of municipal council members by 30%. 
 
 All in all, the Rajoy government can thus be 
said to have been far more aggressive in its approach 
to reducing labor market dualism, but it did so by 
placing almost the full burden of this adjustment 
on a reduction in employment protection for those 
on indefinite contracts. It was also more aggressive 
in its austerity measures, which doubled those im-
posed in Italy.  Implemented in a context of ongo-
ing public spending cuts, the labor market reform 
was followed by a further large bout of employment 
shedding (as had, indeed, occurred with the first re-
form imposed by the Zapatero government.  In the 
year and a half following the reform, employment 
fell by a further 700,000, of which over half a mil-
lion represented a net decline in indefinite contract 
jobs.  Whether this net employment destruction was 
necessary to encourage a further reduction in la-
bor costs and productivity gains is, questionable as 
both processes were well underway at the time of 
the 2012 labor market reform.  The effect was a fur-
ther large decline in public revenue and large scale 
exit of foreign capital by institutional investors. 
 In Italy, we see a pattern of stronger resistance 
to change for the duration of the Berlusconi gov-
ernment, both by the CGIL, which took a stronger 
stance of opposition to reforms than the CISL and in 
some cases the UIL, and political parties (the North-
ern League and the PD faction closest to the CGIL) 
pushed back against austerity measures and reform 
during the Berlusconi period. This was followed by 
the Monti government’s attempt to impose far more 
radical reform measures, in particular with the Forne-
ro labour market reform, which was designed in a 
technocratic fashion, with consultation playing a very 
limited role (Sacchi 2013).  Monti’s strategy, howev-
er, backfired politically as reflected in his dismal elec-
toral performance in the 2013 election, which were 
marked by the decline of the vote for the established 
parties and the rise of Grilli’s Five Star movement. 
By September of that year, the country was back in a 
stand-off between Berlusconi’s PDL, which opposed 
a further increase of the VAT pushed by the European 
Commission, and the Letta government seeking to 
address those external demands. Remarkably, how-
ever, given the Rajoy government’s aggressive labor 
market measures and greater responsiveness to EU 
demands, and given the evidence of strong internal 
devaluation in Spain, the debt spreads of Italy and 
Spain public deb vis à vis the German bund remained 
virtually undistinguishable. This remained true af-
ter the 2013 Italian elections, which further raised 
the level of political uncertainty regarding the Ital-
ian government’s ability to implement EU demands. 
 One way in which the externally driven reform 
process had a clear impact was in reducing the ability 
of governments to participate and sustain social bar-
gains.  This raises some important questions, as a re-
cent literature has argued that major economic crises 
may be “institution eroding,”  tilting the balance of 
power between capital and labor in a way that reduces, 
rather than enhances,  the capacity of social actors to 
reach negotiated agreements (see Sacchi et al. 2010; 
Hyman 2010; Glassner and Keune 2010; Glassner, 
Keune and Marginson 2011; Lehndorff 2011; Ibsen, 
Andersen, Due and Madsen 2011), or producing a 
“disorganized” rather than organized decentralization 
and radical welfare retrenchment that undermines so-
cial compromise (see Doherty 20; Dukelow 2011). 
 In Italy and Spain, external demands for 
pro-cyclical austerity measures and unilateral gov-
ernment action placed a heavy strain on bargaining 
among social actors and governments. Collective 
bargaining reform, in particular, threatened the core 
of the national labor confederations’ leadership ca-
pacity. However, there are also differences between 
the two countries, notably in the ability of the con-
federations to maintain a united stance.   In the case 
of Spain, the Zapatero government’s 2010 austerity 
program provoked a general strike and widespread 
public protests.  Yet the strike action, social cuts and 
reforms of pensions and labor regulation did not 
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entirely destroy the concertation process. Although 
annual union-employer negotiations on wage guide-
lines ground to a halt in 2009, producing no agree-
ment that year, the process was resurrected in 2010 
with an agreement that set nominal guidelines for 
2010 through 2012. Even in the face of the Rajoy 
governments’ austerity program and far more radi-
cal employment reforms, this bipartite bargaining 
process continued. In January 2012, employers and 
unions reached another three year framework agree-
ment setting wage of 0.5 percent for 2012 (a strong 
downward revision of the previous agreement for that 
year), 0.6 percent for 2013 and 2014.  The new wage 
pact also departed from all past wage pacts in that it 
aimed explicitly to produce a fall in real wages.  This 
bipartite piece of concertation, at least, did not break 
down and is widely considered to have been central 
to the internal devaluation in wages that took place in 
Spain (a devaluation that, as the Bank of Spain con-
ceded in February 2014, was considerably more acute 
than aggregate official statistics reflected once the 
changing composition of workers in terms of skills 
and years of experience was taken into account). 
 The UGT and CC.OO. appeared intent on 
maintaining their position as social bargaining part-
ners  on the wage front even as their collision with 
the government on employment law was mounting. 
Following the decree instituting the 2012 labor mar-
ket reform, for instance, the confederations agreed to 
postpone an immediate general strike in favor of a 
course of “ascending” popular mobilization with the 
aim of achieving a softening of the reform as it went 
through the parliamentary approval process. This 
moderation provoked intense criticism and pressure 
from regional nationalist unions in Galicia, Cata-
lonia and the Basque Country to escalate labor ac-
tion.   Nevertheless, the two national confederations 
also continued negotiations on other fronts, signing a 
pact with the government to subsidize youth employ-
ment in late February (El Pais February 22, 2012). 
 
 Unlike Spanish unions, Italian unions were 
divided in their reaction to the Berlusconi govern-
ment’s crisis response policies (the CGIL uniformly 
hostile, CISL broadly accepting them, and the UIL 
disagreeing with some but not all).  Nonetheless, 
the bipartite dialogue between unions and employ-
ers also continued here, producing, for example, an 
agreement to reform the collective bargaining system 
by the CSIL and UIL, though without the CGIL in 
January 2009. The CGIL opposed the promotion of 
company bargaining on productivity and competi-
tiveness and the introduction of ‘opening clauses’ in 
collective agreements to assist restructuring efforts. 
The same month, the CSIL and UIL also signed a 
renewal agreements for public sector employees 
(which the CGIL opposed) and declared their will-
ingness to negotiate proposals based on a White Pa-
per released by the Italian Minister of Labour, Health 
and Social Policy in May 2009, which emphasized 
the need to transfer resources from the pension sys-
tem to ‘social shock absorbers’ (EIROnline, Italy 
06, 2009).  The CGIL’s  call for a four-hour national 
strike by all workers for 12 March 2010 -   demand-
ing  increases in unemployment benefit duration and 
redundancy benefits - was in turn opposed by CISL 
and the UIL.  The split was further accentuated over 
the course of 2010 by developments at two of Fiat’s 
major production plants at which workers, including 
those represented by the CGIL’s metal sector federa-
tion (FIOM) agreed to company level conditions that 
were more flexible than those allowed by the national 
sectoral agreement (Eironline, November 1, 2011).
 The rift between the Italian unions was, none-
theless, patched up by an intersectoral agreement 
between all three confederations and Confindustria 
in June 2011 that specified the procedures to follow 
in situations – such as the one at Fiat- where work-
ers chose to approve company level agreements that 
undercut conditions agreed in national sectoral bar-
gains. The main thrust of this agreement was to allow 
company agreements that include temporary depar-
tures from national sectoral agreements on an experi-
mental basis (Eironline, September 1, 2011). After 
the Italian parliament passed a new law in September 
2011 allowing company-level bargains to opt out of 
national sectoral bargains on a wide range of matters 
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(including working hours, worker classification and 
hiring procedures), Confindustria and the signed an 
addendum to the June intersectoral agreement, which 
committed both side to abide with that agreement 
“by fully implementing its provisions and ensuring 
that all their respective structures are applied at all 
levels.” (EiroOnline, October 1, 2011). This repre-
sented a major shift in the CGIL’s position. But it also 
illustrated employer’s desire to contain the level of 
uncertainty surrounding collective bargaining that 
had been created by some of its moves in the Fiat 
negotiations and the new collective bargaining law. 
 The arrival of the technocratic Monti govern-
ment in December 2011, provided only short-lived 
political relief from the climate of confrontation that 
had marred the Berlusconi period. The new premier 
promised to seek agreements with unions and em-
ployers when taking office. Yet, following the an-
nouncement of the new government’s austerity mea-
sures - which included  26 billion euros in spending 
cuts,  a 30 billion increase in taxes (VAT), and a two 
year  increase in the contributory period for retire-
ment pensions (from 40 to 42 years)  –   confronta-
tion soon resumed.  The most divisive issue was the 
government’s planned labour reform, which involved 
the repeal of Article 18 of the 1970 Workers’ statute 
allowing workers to sue companies for reinstatement 
of their job after a lay off. The proposed law allowed 
companies to fire workers for economic reasons with-
out the threat of such a legal challenge as long as they 
paid compensation of between 15 and 27 week of sal-
ary. At the same time, it also restricted the ability of 
firms to hire workers on a temporary basis.  While 
UIL and CISL showed some willingness to contem-
plate the change in return for more extensive unem-
ployment compensation for younger workers, CGIL 
and Confindustria both opposed it (the first because it 
regarded Article 18 a key element of employment pro-
tection, the latter because it opposed the restriction on 
atypical and temporary work contracts. This led the 
government to tone down the bill so as to allow courts 
to reverse lay-offs under special circumstances and to 
ease some of the restrictions on the use of temporary 
contracts opposed by employers.  Nonetheless, the 
unions and Confindustria both expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the reform after it was passed by the Italian 
Senate in April (FT, March 20 and April 5, 2012).
 Following the 2013 elections, the Letta gov-
ernment, again requiring the support of both the 
Right and the Left, also sought to strike an even 
handed tone, promising tax cuts for those on lower 
income and extending pension coverage for people 
that had been caught with insufficient contribu-
tion histories by the Fornero reform.  The Renzi 
government that came to office in early 2014 also 
moved to expand the coverage of the unemploy-
ment system by extending its coverage in time, and 
set out on a new anti-austerity course, informing 
the Commission that it would put off the require-
ment of keeping the budget deficit at 3 percent for 
a year in order to kick start the economy through a 
10 billion euro tax cut for low income households. 
 While the Italian labor reform did not go as 
far as that carried out by the Rajoy government in 
Spain because it did not touch on questions of internal 
flexibility (personnel and job classification, working 
hours, job description, absenteeism) reforms in both 
countries have reduced the scope for labour unions to 
negotiate specific aspects of the employment relation-
ship, thereby reducing the role of collective bargain-
ing.  By allowing lower level bargains to undercut 
higher level bargains, the Spanish reform in particular 
threatens the ability of the national confederations to 
exert influence over the collective bargaining stances 
of their affiliates. To a lesser extent, the 2011 agree-
ment between the labor confederations and Confin-
dustria did something similar in Italy, but it was pro-
duced through a social pact process and introduced 
only on a temporary, experimental level.   What ef-
fect these changes have in the long-run remains to be 
seen.  But, in the event of economic recovery, barring 
a reversal of collective bargaining reforms introduced 
during the crisis, developments in both countries 
appear consistent with the view that the crisis may ul-
timately produce a form of institutional erosion that 
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undermines the ability of governments and social ac-
tors to reach – and implement – agreements in the fu-
ture. This seems particularly important in light of the 
role that the national unions have played in moderat-
ing wage increases and providing political legitimacy 
for adjustment measures (including pension reform). 
 The contrast between the hardline ap-
proach pursued in Spain and the more moderate 
pace of spending cuts and regulatory reforms in 
Italy (largely as a result of political stalemate) is 
reflected in the much greater impact that austerity 
measures (including increases in taxes, cuts in net 
public wages, and cuts in means-tested benefits) 
have had on household disposable income in Spain 
than Italy over the 2008-2012 period (Figure 11).
Tax increases (foremost in VAT and then income 
taxes) accounted for the largest share of this dif-
ference, with reductions in net public wages and 
means-tested benefits in third and fourth place. 
It is noteworthy that the social spending programs 
that were hardest hit (such as the elder and disabled 
care program stipulated in the Spanish dependen-
cy law of 2006 which was virtually stopped in its 
tracks by regional governments, the youth emanci-
pation rent, which was abolished in 2012, and cuts 
in unemployment benefits after 6 month precisely 
as the proportion of long-term unemployed rose) 
were all key features of the transformation of the 
Spanish welfare state in the two decades prior to 
the crisis which had moved its structure of social 
spending closer to that of the Northern European 
states.  Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that despite 
the more aggressive cuts and far more drastic 
drop in household disposable income, and the far 
more dramatic rise in unemployment, the more 
developed Spanish social protection system (in 
particular the unemployment benefit system) was 
able to limit the rise in the proportion of people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion to less than 
4 per cent between 2008 and 2012, compared to 
Italy’s rise to slightly above 5 per cent.  
Figure 11:  Simulated Aggregate Effect and Composition of Fiscal Consolidation Measures 
2008-2012 
 
Source: IMF (2014, p. 51) 
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 Notwithstanding the last point, the balance of 
austerity measures in Spain (in particular the large 
increase in the VAT and considerable cuts in public 
pensions) all contributed to the fact that Spain suf-
fered the biggest rise in inequality among the nine 
European countries that implemented substantial 
austerity packages in the wake of the financial crisis 
(IMF 2014).    The contrast to Italy, in this regard, 
is clearly illustrated in Figure 12, which shows the 
changes in household disposable income on differ-
ent income deciles that can be attributed to differ-
ent types of austerity measures in the two countries. 
When we add this to the counterproductive effects 
austerity had on employment, bank balance sheets 
and ultimately the public debt, it is striking just how 
much damage Spain’s compliance with the pro-cycli-
cal austerity measures dictated by the EU had caused 
in Spain compared to Italy over the 2008-12 period. 
5. Conclusion: Social Model Outcomes of the 
Eurozone crisis
 The view that the problems of the Eurozone’s 
deficit countries are rooted in their social models has 
been a commonplace in debates about the currency 
union. It is reinforced by the propensity among com-
parative welfare state and VOC scholars to empha-
size the similarities between countries such as Spain 
and Italy, even to view them as instances of a similar 
historically rooted model of capitalism that places 
them at a competitive disadvantage in a globalized 
economy. This view – which we can term the “com-
petitiveness thesis” - has also been accepted, when 
not embraced, by economic policy elites in Italy and 
Spain and served to justify the demands of creditor 
governments for measures intended to force adjust-
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Figure 12  
Change in Household Disposable Figure by Type of Measure and Income Group 2007-2012 
(Percentage) 
     Net wages           Public Pensions  Non-Pension Benefits Income Taxes/SIC VAT 
Source: IMF (2014) p. 53 
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ment through internal devaluation. Such measures – 
consisting of fiscal austerity in the midst of recession 
and simultaneous cuts in employment protection and 
social benefits - were pushed by the EU Commission 
and ECB (in tandem with national central banks) as 
conditions for ECB support even when this meant 
stepping far outside the legal remit of EU institutions. 
While the tendency among policy elites has been to 
accept the competitiveness thesis, it is widely under-
stood by financial market actors that the Eurozone 
is deeply flawed in its macro-institutional architec-
ture. These flaws include the absence of a confirmed 
lender of last resort for governments and banks, the 
lack of real time banking union (including a com-
mon resolution fund and deposit guarantee), and 
the absence of mutualizing public debt instruments 
with a collective guarantee that could redress the 
perception of sovereign default and/or redenomina-
tion risks, and to address the kinds of asymmetric 
financial flows that are to be expected in a curren-
cy union.  The repeated episodes of sovereign debt 
market contagion, of large interest rate spreads on 
government debt issues, and the acute fragmentation 
of public debt and credit markets (which impede the 
transmission of monetary policy in central bank par-
lance) are all evidence of these macro-institutional 
shortcomings.  Given the protracted failure to reach 
agreement on such macro-institutional reform of the 
Eurozone, the burden of adjustment has been placed 
– often with perverse consequences – on the trans-
formation of debtor country social models by way 
of “structural reform” (the prevailing euphemism for 
labor market liberalization and social spending cuts). 
 This paper has offered a number of reasons 
why we should doubt the premises behind the com-
petition thesis and the prescriptions to which it has 
led. First, the evolution of the Italian and Span-
ish social models in the decades prior to the Euro-
zone crisis diverged significantly, with Spain mov-
ing further in an activation and flexibility oriented 
direction by rebalancing social spending than Italy 
and showing much greater labor market flexibil-
ity (albeit through temporary work contracts) tan 
Italy. This divergence illustrates important dif-
ferences in the political dynamics of regulatory 
change in the two countries; differences that chal-
lenge the conventional wisdom about a historically 
persistent dynamic of social model development. 
 Social model change was influenced by dif-
ferent sets of economic and political constraints and 
by the different macro-economic conditions with 
which the two countries joined the Eurozone. Spain’s 
more orthodox  fiscal policies in the decades prior 
to EMU allowed it to join the Euro with a particu-
larly low level of public debt whereas Italy joined 
with the burden of one of the highest public debts. 
However, the disjuncture between Spain and not 
just Italy but also other mayor Eurozone countries 
set the Spanish economy up for unbalanced growth. 
Given the different starting points (high public debt 
and consequently high fiscal constraint in Italy and 
other major Eurozone economies, low public debt 
and low fiscal constraint in Spain), the shift to a sin-
gle interest rate policy in the Eurozone gave rise to 
very different macro-economic dynamics and behav-
iors in the two countries.  For Spain, EMU meant 
a shift to a significant laxer monetary policy stance 
than would have been taken by its central bank, and 
the combination of this laxer monetary policy with 
the absence of external fiscal constraint (given the 
country’s low and improving public debt position 
and what Fitoussi and Saraceno (2013) call the Eu-
rozone’s constitution) led to a boom in domestic pri-
vate credit (backstopped by interbank flows from the 
rest of the Eurozone). This allowed the country to 
make even larger strides in reshaping its social mod-
el such as to encourage labor force activation (seen 
as the central challenge of Southern welfare states 
at the start of the period) and provide a greater mea-
sure of “flexicurity.” Given a low level of public debt 
and ample room for private lending, this allowed for 
very fast demand driven employment growth but 
also skewed the character of that growth, leading to 
a real estate bubble of unprecedented dimensions.
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 By contrast, Italy, which adopted the Euro 
with a high level of public debt (most of it accumu-
lated prior to the electoral reform of 1993) saw a 
decade of continuing slow growth, with both public 
and private investment restrained by the continuing 
need for fiscal consolidation. These different mac-
roeconomic contexts played an important role in 
shaping the course of social model reform in the two 
countries: facilitating social model transformation 
in Spain while creating obstacles and reinforcing re-
sistance in Italy. Indeed, the dominant feature of the 
Spanish social model that may have contributed to 
the Spanish economic dynamic – the high share of 
fixed-term employment – was one that imbued the 
labor market with a great deal of flexibility, even if in 
a segmented manner. And this leads us to question the 
extent to which the troubles of Spain and Italy in the 
Eurozone can be attributed to social model features 
as opposed to other factors, such as sectoral growth 
and demand patterns that were reinforced by dynam-
ics at work in the Eurozone at large during the run-up 
to the crisis, such as the much noted rise in finan-
cial flows from richer to poorer countries in the area. 
 Secondly, governments and social actors in 
both countries were effective in in maintaining real 
wage moderation.  However, while labour compen-
sation grew at low or moderate rates by Eurozone 
standards, both countries experienced low per hour 
labor productivity growth measured at the aggregate 
level relative to other countries following entry into 
the Euro, resulting in rising current account deficits. 
However, this apparent loss in competitiveness can-
not easily be attributed to social model characteris-
tics.  As noted, in the case of Spain this low productiv-
ity growth in the aggregate was primarily a reflection 
of a sectoral composition effect given the dispropor-
tionate growth of employment in lower wage and 
productivity sectors. There is some evidence that 
a similar shift in sectoral employment and growth 
patterns was at work in Italy, albeit in a context of 
much lower domestic demand. One feature of the so-
cial model - the reliance on fixed-term employment 
(much higher in Spain but on the rise as well in Italy 
following the reforms of 1997 and 2003) – may have 
abetted these sectoral trends, further skewing em-
ployment growth towards low productivity sectors. 
But, it is noteworthy that the cost and price perfor-
mance of the tradables sectors in both countries was 
good throughout the period and that the deterioration 
in their current account positions was due primarily to 
price-developments in the non-tradable sector. This, 
as others have argued, is the signature of a demand 
(rather than a competitiveness) shock that can be at-
tributed to the rise in financial flows from richer to 
poorer Eurozone countries in the run up to the crisis. 
 Third, the reasons behind Spain and Italy’s 
perceived sovereign debt risk were fundamentally 
different, and clearly understood to be so (high lev-
els of real estate related private debt coupled with a 
sharp drop in employment in Spain, political stale-
mate surrounding the issue of pension reform and 
high public debt in Italy). Such different situations 
would seem to call for different responses. In Spain, 
pro-cyclical austerity measures promised to worsen 
the outlook for Spanish banks and this in turn the 
credit rating of Spanish public debt (since the pub-
lic sector would have to rescue the banking sector). 
Over 60 per cent of that debt was held among the 
assets of the domestic banking sector itself, hence 
creating a classic negative feedback loop between 
the quality of bank assets and sovereign debt (An-
gelini et al. 2014).  Yet, the reforms demanded from 
2010 on by their Euro partners were fundamentally 
the same (austerity and labor market liberalization 
that would facilitate internal devaluation to boost 
exports).   In the case of Spain, where the largest 
problems involved employment shedding and asso-
ciated private credit defaults, austerity contributed 
to the self-fulfilling prophecy that bond markets had 
feared (the collapse of part of the banking sector) and 
that led to the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding 
on the ESM financed rescue of the banking sector. 
That memorandum, in turn, set the basis for the 2012 
labor market reform and further austerity measures 
that produced a further contraction of employment 
and a continuing rise in credit delinquencies.  The 
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one measure that could have broken the cycle be-
tween private and public debt quality – allowing the 
ESM to inject capital directly into Spanish banks 
rather than force the Spanish governments to social-
ize losses - was blocked by the German government. 
 Fourth, where social model institutions do 
seem to have made a difference is in mediating the 
labour market impact of the Eurozone crisis.  Yet here 
too the record challenges the Brussels-Frankfurt con-
sensus on the way to address the Eurozone crisis.  In 
spite of Spain’s significantly greater movement in the 
direction of an activation friendly social policy, faster 
and more extensive implementation of labor market 
reforms responding to Eurogroup demands than Italy, 
and in spite of a far more extensive internal devalua-
tion and enviable export performance,  its  unemploy-
ment rate still more than doubled that of Italy at the 
end of 2013 and its growth prospects for the follow-
ing two years were no better than that of its neigh-
bor (OECD Economic Outlook, November 2013). 
 The contrast in the evolution of employment 
in the two countries –with Spain registering strong 
improvement in (per hour worked) labor productiv-
ity growth at the expense of a large net employment 
contraction and Italy experiencing far greater em-
ployment stability but slower productivity growth 
- can largely be explained by prior macroeconomic 
conditions. Because Italy did not experience a Span-
ish style demand boom and real estate bubble, it also 
did not face the rapid collapse of employment in an 
overgrown construction and related sectors that was 
part of Spain’s rollercoaster. But regulatory and po-
litical conditions also mattered. First, the particularly 
high share of fixed-term employment in Spain facili-
tated job shedding from the start.  Secondly, once ef-
forts to counter the negative effects of the financial 
crisis through countercyclical policies in 2008 and 
2009 were cut short by the Eurogroup (with the help 
of the ECB, as reflected in the August 2011 letters to 
the Berlusconi and Zapatero governments), govern-
ments in both countries tried to couple austerity with 
labor market measures to facilitate internal devalu-
ation by lowering employment protection.  Holding 
an absolute majority, the Rajoy government in Spain 
was able to move much further and farther in this di-
rection than the Monti or Letta governments in Italy. 
However, as it was implemented in the midst of pro-
cyclical fiscal cuts, the reduction in employment pro-
tection for workers on indefinite contracts in Spain 
resulted in more employment shedding than creation. 
In Italy the intensity of employment destruction was 
far lower thanks to the use of employment sharing 
arrangements and the parliamentary roll-back of the 
most radical features of the Fornero labor-market 
reform at the end of the Monti government period.
 The more aggressive approach in Spain, 
which already had a more flexible labor market and 
social protection system, resulted in a considerable 
reduction in unit labor costs by raising aggregate 
productivity measures. This did not occur in Italy. 
Yet the internal devaluation achieved in Spain was 
largely the result of the destruction of employment 
and its result was an almost continuous aggravation 
of the economic crisis, with an important rise in the 
proportion of long-term unemployed and the asso-
ciated risks of hysteresis in the labor market. Italy 
failed to achieve such an internal devaluation, struc-
tural reforms or the kind growth in exports displayed 
by the Spanish economy. Yet remarkably, in spite of 
all this and a considerably higher public debt burden 
than Spain’s, its sovereign debt risk spreads versus 
the bund did not differ much from Spain’s after 2011. 
This must be largely attributed to the fact that the 
slower pace of reform in Italy also limited the vicious 
circle between employment destruction, banking 
sector solvency and sovereign debt we see in Spain. 
The very pace of labor market reforms, job shedding, 
internal devaluation and collapsed demand in Spain 
fed directly into the continued perceived instability 
of the Spanish economy in relation to its apparently 
far more sclerotic Italian counterpart. In the absence 
of any reasonable growth prospects (given the utter 
collapse of domestic demand and continuous drop 
in household disposable income), labor market de-
regulation showed little sign of contributing to a 
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recovery.  Indeed, by producing further unemploy-
ment outlays it continued to threaten Spain’s ability to 
escape the debt crisis, raising the question of whether 
the Spanish governments’ more aggressive path will 
ultimately pay off.  Indeed, although the slow pace of 
reform in Italy has largely been the result of political 
stalemate, Italian governments may have been better 
able to contain the social and financial repercussions 
of the ongoing Eurozone crisis by building (for an ex-
tended period of time) on non-market mechanisms in 
its institutional arsenal to encourage work time shar-
ing and eschewing improvement in productivity mea-
sures that were achieved largely through employment 
destruction in Spain.  Such a conclusion also finds 
support in the fact that the two countries’ sovereign 
debt remained virtually indistinguishable as of 2013. 
 Meanwhile in both countries spending cuts 
have fallen heavily on education, health care and 
other public investments linked to long-term eco-
nomic success.  In Spain, a good part of the welfare 
state recalibration intended to promote labor market 
activation (minimum income support and care for 
the elderly and disabled) has also suffered large cuts. 
The ultimate effects of all this on the social mod-
els of the two countries remains to be seen. To date, 
however, the inability of governments to accompa-
ny labor market and social spending reforms with 
measures to support economic recovery appears to 
have forced them into a set of perverse trade-offs 
between maintaining employment and increasing 
productivity in the short run, and between short term 
austerity goals and long term growth prospects. In 
the context of a still institutionally highly flawed 
Eurozone which cannot prevent further episodes 
of self-inflicted financial crises, this carries at least 
as large a risk of political upheaval and social dis-
content as it does a way out of the economic crisis.
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endnotes
 1. This paper is partly based on an earlier research collaboration with Martin Rhodes. I would 
like to thank Martin Rhodes, as well as Andrew Martin, Jon Erik Dølvik, Ana Marta Guillen, 
Maarten Keune, Luis Moreno, Emilio Ontiveros, Paul Pierson, Marino Regini, Stefano Sacchi 
and Jelle Visser for their feedback on this and earlier versions of the paper.  
 2.  It is estimated that in 2006, some 70 per cent of the Italian unemployed did not receive any 
form of income assistance (Jessoula 2011))
 3.   Prior to this point, all contracts outside seasonal work (in agriculture and tourism) were 
deemed to be indefinite.
 4.  There is some evidence that union confederations began to restrain and coordinate wage de-
mands unilaterally in Spain from the 1994 on as well (Perez, 2000; Molina and Rhodes 2011).
 5.   Large Italian firms appear to have preferred this situation because wage compression acted 
as a “productivity whip” that encouraged both employers and employees to engage in sophis-
ticated education and training programs supporting their higher quality production strategies 
(Hancke and Herrmann 2007) and they opposed efforts by the small firm wing of Confindustria 
to reform the status quo in the early 2000s (Molina and Rhodes 2007).
 6.   The purpose of the latter was to cover regulatory vacuums that had been left by the PSOE’s 
1994 labor market reform in those provinces where no employers association existed to regulate 
work conditions through collective bargaining. 
 7.   Although workers covered by national-sectoral agreements rose from 10 percent in 2001 to 
25 percent in 2006, as many as 53 percent of workers were still covered by provincial sectoral 
agreements at the end of that year. 
 8.   The national leadership of both the union and employer confederations set out to reduce the 
fragmentation of bargaining that allowed the sheltered sector of the economy to set the rate of 
pay increase, thereby undermining competitiveness. But the national employer confederation was 
unable to use the voluntary commitment of the national social pact to prod along their provincial 
sectoral affiliates which preferred to keep most workers covered by bargaining at the provincial 
sectoral level (Perez 1999, 2000).
 9.   In the face of a second bout of employment shedding in Spain following the 2012 labor 
reform, the Eurogroup proposed a further reduction in dismissal costs, a plan later endorsed by 
the IMF (See El Diario, May 14, 2013 and El Pais, June 19, 2013). Both institutions put similar 
heavy pressure on the Letta government in Italy.
10.   This may be indicative of the fact that the overall unemployment figures in Italy do not 
capture considerable underemployment for non-youth due to work-time sharing (see more on this 
below).   
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endnotes
 11.  The coefficient of variation of employment rates in Spain fell from 10.8 to 7.5 overall 
between 1999 and 2007 (and from 17.6 to 11.8 for women), whereas Italy’s regional 
employment disparities remained the highest in the EU 27 – declining more marginally from 17.4 
to 16.3 overall, but more notably for women from 30.2 to 26.4. 
12.   As Martin Wolf has pointed out, there was a strong connection between changing public and 
private debt positions in all major OECD countries, with countries experiencing 
reductions in their public debt seeing commensurate expansion of private debt, and public debt 
compensating for declines in private lending.
13.   Domestic demand in Spain grew by an average annual rate of 4.2  percent in the period of 
1999-2008, compared to an average of 1.2 percent in Italy (OECD Economic Outlook n.84; 
Annex) The final consumption expenditure of the general government in Spain  was 
consistently lower than in Italy (by two percentage points at 17.1-17.8 per cent in 1996-2004 
before converging on Italy’s 21 per cent in 2007-9 (though the EU 15 average was still one point 
ahead).
14.   Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector, which stood at a similar 17 per cent in 
both Italy and Spain in 1995 (in line with the EU15 average) also grew at a much faster rate in 
Spain (to 24.8 per cent Spain in 2008 compared to 18.5 per cent in Italy). Capital formation was 
concentrated in production and infrastructure, as reflected in a particularly high level of equipment 
investment in the 1999-2007 period in Spain.
15.   The magnitude of purchases by Eurozone surplus banks of Spanish bank issued 
covered debt can be garnered from the BIS study of van Rixtel and Gasperini (2013) and from a 
European Commission Study of Eurozone country surpluses (European Commission 2012b, 
pp.47-53). See also the Wall Street Journal  June 27 and September 24, 2012). 
16.   There is considerable evidence that employers in Spain use temporary contracts either as 
screening device or as a way to lower their overall labor costs, with most workers during the boom 
years moving from a temporary position to an indefinite position either prior to the completion of 
their first contract or at the 3 year point when they could no longer be employed on a temporary 
basis (Guell and Petrolongo 2003). 
17.   There is some question as to whether some of the changes that were designed to promote 
female labor force activation can be considered a cause or consequence of this shift in social 
protection. The latter can be said of the 2006 Dependency Law and the 2007 plan to extend free 
childcare to ages 0-2.
18.    Based on figures from Eurostat’s harmonized Labour Force Survey Database. Net job 
shedding of temporary workers began in 2007.
19.    Skill intensity is most commonly measured in the literature by the share of students enrolled 
in vocational training (Estevez-Abe et al. (2001), though see Culpepper (2007) for an alternative 
measure, and the analysis of Barro and Lee (1994) suggesting that enrolment rates do not show 
a significant impact on growth, while average years of secondary education does). The OECD’s 
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Continuing Vocational Training Database suggests that the proportion of employed persons 
participating in continuing training and education in Italy was, at 36 percent in 2010, barely different 
from that of Germany (39%). In Spain, it was considerably higher, at 48 percent.  Broader measures of 
human capital offer a complex picture. Both countries scored particularly low in the ranking of average 
literacy and numeracy measures offered in the OECD’s Adult Skill’s survey (OECD 2013), but there are 
reasons to question the relevance of these ranking differences for aggregate labour productivity among 
the top 15 advanced industrialized countries. The 1997 through 2009 Pisa rounds show that both 
countries were characterized by a disproportionally high percentage of working age population with 
“below upper secondary education” compared to other Eurozone countries (46 and 38 percent for Spain 
and Italy respectively in the last round). But both also reduced this percentage significantly over the 
period (Spain by about twice as much as Italy).  On the other hand, Spain had a high proportion of 
population with tertiary education (30 percent as opposed to Italy’s 14 percent), a reflection of its higher 
spending on upper education prior to the crisis. 
20.   Employment protection for indefinite workers in terms of dismissal costs was considerably lower in 
Italy than in Spain (or in Germany for that matter) because Italian law never envisaged automatic  
monetary  compensation for unjustified layoffs (for further discussion, see Sacchi 2013).  Moreover,  
although Italian law in some ways creates greater uncertainty for employers in firms with more than 15 
workers by prescribing that workers get the choice of full reinstatement with seniority in the case of a 
judgment in their favor, when monetary compensation is granted, the amounts (number of days of 
compensation per year) were lower than in Spain.
21.   Figures are based on Employment data from the OECD’s National Accounts Database.
22.    Indeed, in the Italian case, where a significant decline in the share of employee compensation in 
GDP might have been a boon to investment, wage moderation may have had a negative effect on 
productivity by providing higher rents for uncompetitive companies (the undoing of the productivity 
whip) and further depressing domestic demand. Even the governor of the Bank of Italy bemoaned low 
wage growth and its contribution to slow economic growth, although he attributed this to low 
productivity gains compared to firms in Britain and France (l’Occidentale, October 30, 2007).
23.   A sectoral shift in resource allocation to lower productivity sectors may already have been 
encouraged in Italy by the abolition of the scala mobile, which, because of its effect of wage 
compression, is also thought to have worked as a “productivity-whip” on Italian firms (Hancke and Her-
mann, 2007).
24.   The predominance of very small firms has also long been identified as one of the major factors 
behind low productivity growth since the 1980s in Italy by Pagano and Schivardi (2003) and Amatori et 
al. (2011) who attribute Italy’s problems to the failure of the institutional environment to provide 
incentives for firm growth. 
25.    Indeed, only in the case of France, the authors find, was export competitiveness a significant 
determinant of a growing current account deficit.
26.    Major institutions, including Deutsche Bank announced that they were working on contingency 
plans for such an outcome.
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27.   As was subsequently revealed by the Spanish and Italian press, an in the memoire of Rodriguez 
Zapatero, the ECB, with the support of the two countries national central banks and backed by the 
Commission, sent virtually identical letters to the Italian and Spanish executives on August 5, 2011 
spelling out the social model reforms it expected as conditions for its continued bond buying of Italian 
and Spanish debt and the extension of new Long Term Refinancing Operations.  The Memorandum of 
Understanding signed by Spain to obtain the credit line for its banking sector rescue also committed the 
government to advance labour market and bargaining reforms in line with Eurogroup demands.
28.   The depth of Spain’s employment crisis suggests that this may ultimately have had deleterious ef-
fects given that labor market liberalization was carried out in the context of highly pro-cyclical austerity 
measures.
29.   Calculations based on OECD National Account figures, GDP at constant prices (output method). It 
should be noted that the Spanish economy continued to grow into 2008. Calculating the contraction from 
2008 through 2012 renders a cumulative 5.6%.
30.   The total number of jobs at the end of 2011, for instance, was still 4 million higher than it had been 
in 1999. Labour force participation (for those in the 16-64 age group) also still remained relatively high 
at 73 percent in 2011.
31.   Employment in the construction sector dropped 57 per cent between 2008 and 2011. In industry 
(excluding construction) the drop was of 20 per cent, and in services only 3 percent (figures calculated 
from the Labour Force Statistics section of the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators Series).
32.   As in Spain (although involving fewer people) the brunt of the employment contraction fell on 
those on ‘atypical’ work contracts, the share of which had risen following the Treu and Biagi reforms. 
Thus, in the year up until March 2009, Italy lost 261,000 temporary and atypical jobs, primarily workers 
with no eligibility for unemployment benefits or other forms of social support. (OECD Economic 
Outlook, 2009; Molina and Rhodes 2008; Berton, Richiardi and Sacchi 2009). In both countries 
disadvantaged groups, such as youth, immigrants, and low-skilled workers, all overrepresented in the 
temporary and atypical contract segment, bore the brunt of job losses. The job shedding in Spain also 
had a strong gender bias, with far more men loosing employment than women initially, due to the 
sectoral nature of the contraction. However, as the Zapatero government, and subsequently the Rajoy 
government imposed increasingly hard cuts on the public sector, women, with strong concentrations in 
the education and health care sectors, also began to see higher rates of unemployment. Unemployment 
for immigrants stood at 28 percent by the end of 2009 (OECD Employment Outlook 2009).
33.   The government approved 8 billion Euros in subsidies for a program supporting local 
employment initiatives and allowing local governments to increase their deficit spending. A law in 
March 2009 provided subsidies to companies hiring unemployed workers, and lowered social security 
charges for companies reducing working hours in lieu of dismissals.
34.    Introduced in 1991, the “mobility allowance” was a generous unemployment benefit separate 
from ordinary unemployment benefits, equal to around 80 per cent of the previous wage for 12 months, 
extendable to 48 months but only available to those permanent workers. Workers on atypical contracts 
were also excluded from the ordinary unemployment benefit, which required at least two years of 
insurance payment and contributions paid for at least 52 weeks in the two years prior to unemployment. 
20
ces papers - open forum # 55
endnotes
Only 7 per cent of unemployed workers in 2005 could claim ‘ordinary unemployment benefit’. Atypical 
workers who met contribution criteria (most did not) could access a reduced unemployment benefit with 
a maximum duration equal to the days worked in the previous year, up to a maximum of 180 days, and 
replacement rates between 35 and 40 per cent. 
35.   It also facilitated so-called “express dismissals” first introduced in 2002 whereby companies could 
dismiss workers without having to justify the dismissal, waiting for administrative approval, or risking a 
legal sanction by paying the maximum severance pay of 45 days per year worked up front.
36.   In the words of the Labor Minister, Valeriano Gomez, the government preferred to have “one more 
worker on a temporary contract rather than one more unemployed worker.” (El Pais, August 26, 2011).
37.   The measure was opposed by both unions (who regarded it as a way to undermine minimum 
common standards) and employers (who sought to protect the ability of their provincial affiliates to act 
as the principal actors in collective bargaining (El Pais, June 6, 2011)).  The government also created the 
legal basis for the introduction  of lifelong individual capitalization funds that workers would be able to 
use in the future  in cases of dismissal or transfer to another location (a scheme widely referred to as the 
“Austrian-model”  that had been pushed by the unions as an alternative to the collective bargaining 
reform).
38.   The expansion would take place in December 2011 via low cost 36 month loans made available to 
banks allowing government securities as collateral, and was critical to make sure that banks were able 
to pay off their own maturing debt in the first three months of 2012. It also allowed for mortgage backed 
securities as collateral and became the precursor of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT program) 
announced in August 2012.  
  
39.   It also put in place some changes to prevent abuse of atypical work contracts and placed a small 
labor tax penalty of 1.4% on temporary contracts.
40.  The Rajoy government responded by creating an 8 billion euro credit line to advance payment to 
regional governments, many of which had fallen severely behind in their payments to providers but 
remained firm in its demands (El Pais February 28, 2012 and March 5, 2011).  
 41.  In January, Standard and Poor’s had announced that it would impose further rating cuts on Spain 
if the new government did not impose a sufficiently radical labor market reform (El Pais January 13, 
2012). 
 42.  Reflecting this consensus, in November 2009, the government had also passed a ‘sustainable 
economy bill’, a large part of which was devoted to professional training reforms.
 
43.  The design of the reforms was marked by tension within the new government between the Labor 
and Finance Ministers on one hand (who are understood to have opposed some of the most radical 
elements in the reform package) and the new Economy minister, who was deployed as the main 
interlocutor with other Euro-zone finance ministers and pushed to a more radical reform to assuage 
international markets.  
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44.   The reform also cut the maximum established severance pay for “unjustified” dismissals to 33 days 
per year (this applies to all hires from the date of the decree, as well as to any years worked by current 
holders of indefinite contracts past the date of the decree) with a maximum of 24 month pay.
 
45.   It also introduced new subsidies for employers who employ youth (up to the age of 30) or those 
over the age of 45 (with a larger subsidy offered for women than men in this last category). 
46.   It sets adjustments for inflation to inflation that exceeded the ECB’s 2 percent target and even takes 
into account a rise in oil prices, so that part of inflation accounted for by oil price rises should not be 
compensated.
47.   The fact that the number of younger workers, workers with lower skills and workers with less years 
of experience dropped significantly during the period of employment destruction means that the real 
drop in wages is masked by the fact that the labor force in 2012 was made up of a greater proportion of 
higher skilled and experienced workers (Bank of Spain 2014). 
48.   El Pais, February 12, 2012.  As part of their efforts,  CC.OO. leaders met with the Popular Party 
parliamentary delegation after the passing of the labor market decree in this effort (El Pais, February 23, 
2012)
49.   This aggravation of inequality occurred despite efforts to protect, and even raise, benefits accruing 
to the most vulnerable members of society, including a minimum social assistance payment for the long 
term unemployed introduced under the Zapatero government and the Rajoy government’s decision to 
raise the top tax rate (for those earning above euros 300.000) up to 55 per cent. 
 
50.   There is some evidence discussed below that some features of the Spanish and Italian production 
regimes (such as the firm size structure of the private sectors) and the prevalence of temporary 
employment, in particular in Spain, may also have been a contributing factor. 
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